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GAME THEORY AND THE APPLICATION TO MAINLAND CHINA-TAIWAN
RELATIONS FROM 1949-1995
Po-tung Chang, M. A.
Western Michigan University, ·1996
This study is dedicated to evaluating the capacity of game-theoretical models
in analyzing and explaining international crises like mainland China-Taiwan relations.
To highlight and reflect the nature of these complicated long-run relations, the author
formulates a dynamic game model based on the combination of three well-known
models, Deadlock, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken instead of occupying one
dominant model.
The mainland China-Taiwan relations (1949-1995) are divided into three
individual phases in accordance with the configuration of game models: (1) the
military confrontation phase (1949-78); (2) the peaceful competition phase (1978-86);
and (3) the premature cooperation phase (1987-95). By generating and suggesting
hypotheses, e.g., Chicken is more suitable than Prisoner's Dilemma in explaining
mainland China-Taiwan relations in the post-Cold War era., the author tries to
identify the likely patterns of strategy-choosing behavior of mainland China and
Taiwan in terms of analyzing how, when , and why both sides adopted and shifted the
strategies from one period to another. Also, the author witnesses a couple of
limitations for the applications of game models.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Scope and Purpose.
In their influential book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, von
Neumann and Morenstem introduced a new instrument of analysis. They called this
instrument "game theory" a way to address complicated social or political issues.
Under the leadership and efforts of Schelling, Luce, and Rapoport (up to the 1960s),
game theory was developed as a relatively integrated and concise theory in comparison
to other types of rational choice theory. Even more social scientists with limited
mathematical training became interested in game theory, beginning to study the primary
assumptions and characteristics of this theory, applying it to describe the world around
us.

Because of the "usefulness of drawing analogies between real world situations
and particular games or types of game," 1 during the past five decades of its existence,
political scientists frequently applied game theory to the analysis of international
relations or crises such as the Berlin Crisis of 1958-60, the Cuban missile Crisis of 1962,
the Cyprus Conflict, and the like. In this thesis, I attempt to attain a two-track purpose.

Ken Binmore, Essays on the Foundations of
Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 32.
1

1

Game Theory (Cambridge,

2
On the one hand, I will examine the capacity of game theory in generating relevant
hypotheses by the applications of game-theoretical models to international conflicts.
That is, I expect to see if it can help us understand a strategic situation by means of
suggesting hypotheses. In terms ofstrategy selection and transformation ofthe players,
I hope that it will contribute to our primary understanding ofthe patterns ofinteraction
between mainland China and Taiwan in the past 40 years.
Typically, the scope ofgame theory focuses on situations in which an individual
is competing with other individuals. This also refers to situations of interest conflict
among groups and nations. By means of the review of literature dealing with the
applications of game theory, our attention will be drawn to the salient characteristics
and uses of game theory. In particular, two-by-two models, as they concisely describe
"the basic structure ofthe crisis2," in which a strategic situation is highlighted.
What is game theory? In order to begin answering this question, we need to
examine some basic concepts and assumptions. Overall, game theory is formulated
based on two relevant assumptions: ( 1) the idea ofrationality (or rational actors); and
(2) expected utility. To simplify understanding ofthe concept ofrationality, describing
the rational choice approach which shares assumptions with game theory is necessary.
Theorists derive the rational choice approach from a series ofassumptions, i.e., utility
maximization, patterns of individual preferences, decision making under uncertainty,

Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 83.
2

3

and the centrality of individuals in the explanation of collective outcomes. 3 Elster
contends that a rational-choice explanation or prediction of an action should meet three
sets of requirements. First, the action is adopted under the following optimal conditions:
(1) the action is the best or the relatively best strategy for the actor to satisfy her/his
desire derived from her/his belief; (2) that belief is the best he or she could formulate
given the evidence; and (3) how much evidence collected is itself optimal and
corresponds with her/his desire. Second, the relationship between desire and belief
must be consistent, i.e., free of internal contradictions. The last requirement gives
emphasis to a set of causal conditions among the desires, the beliefs, and the actions.
That is, the desire and the belief must not only rationalize the action, but results from
them "in a right way. 4" To be sure, based on the assumption, we tend to be rational and
expect that others will behave rationally in return. The rational choice approach has
been regarded as "one of the dominant paradigms of political and social science,
offering insightful, rigorous, and parsimonious expectations. 5" More literature with
respect to the relationship between the rational choice approach and game theory will
be discussed in a latter section.

Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 13.
3

4

Jon Elster, "Introduction," Rational Choice, Jon Elster, ed. (New York: New York
University Press, 1986), p. 16.
5

Kristen Monroe, "The Theory of Rational Action: What Is It? How Useful Is It for
Political Science?" Political Science: Looking to the Future, William Crotty, ed.
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991), p. 2.

4
Like the rational choice approach, game theory is based on the assumption of
rationality because it assumes that each player behaves as a rational actor in order to
maximize his interests or minimize his losses in a game, i.e., under a conflict situation.
In other words, game theory attempts to analyze rational actors who may or may not
have common or diverse goals under certain conflict situations. Thus, one may raise the
question: Why should we study rational actors? According to Binmore, the answer
could be that the rational choice approach (or game theory) not only assumes the
rationality of the actors but also their attitudes and treatments to each other "as though
they were all rational in the same sense." One advantage of this viewpoint is that the
actors are not viewed as "omniscient mathematical prodigies. 6" Besides,
communication and discussion would be impossible if these activities were not based
on the essential assumption of rationality, i.e., each individual believes in the rationality
of the others.7
Unlike the rational choice approach, game theory is eager to avoid extending its
scope into the psychological arena, i.e., it tries not to describe and analyze the
transformations or interactions between the players' desire or belief. Put another way,
game theory is not supposed to justify the players' goals as right or wrong. Through
well-formulated models, it aims to explain how the players achieve their goals under

6
7

Ken Binmore, p. 61.

K. Midgaard, "On the Signification of Language and a Richer Concept of
Rationality," Politics as Rational Action, L. Lewin and E. Vedung, eds. (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1980), pp. 83-97.

5
the situation in which the players have completely conflicting or mutual interests and
their actions are interdependent. Of course, game theory is based on the following
hypothesis on rationality: the more the players know about the game and the other
player, the easier it should be for them to respond to each other's reasoning and to
predict each other's actions.8 Then, we may raise the following questions: Who will
win or lose in a game if each player is rational in choosing strategies and actions? Could
it be possible that rational actions result in unexpected or irrational outcomes to the
players? According to one of the characteristics of game theory, the final results are
determined by the mixture of the players' actions and the structure of the game. In
other words, a rational action may not guarantee the expected outcome, for example,
in the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which both rational actors choose the strategy conducive
to their own maxim interest but end up suffering the second worse outcome. How can
we solve such a conflict situation like Prisoner's Dilemma, i.e., the conflict between
individual and collective rationality? Or, in Axelrod's words, what conditions can foster
"the emergency of cooperation9"? Arguments and explanations related to the questions
we raised will be covered in the literature review.
Schelling notes that what a rational action means ts not only

intelligent

8

Cristina Bicchieri, Rationality and Coordination (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), p. x.
9

Axelrod emphasized on frequent contacts among players and the principle of
reciprocity as two key factors conductive to foster cooperation; see Robert M. Axelrod,
The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 27-55.

6

behavior, but also behavior "motivated by conscious calculation of advantages,
calculation that in tum is based on an explicated and internally consistent value
system."10 His argument is similar to one of the major assumptions of utility theory: A
person can precisely make up his preference ordering among various alternatives and
assign quantitative units like money to each alternative. As for another relevant
assumption of utility theory, it emphasizes that a person knows well what probability is
attached to given alternatives. In fact, they derive the concept of "expected utility"
from the combination of the preceding two assumptions of utility theory. That is, a
rational actor can calculate his or her expected utility by the following axiom:

EU (A)=

L

P (S) U [(S, A)], he or she will choose the strategy A so that

all S
EU (A) is-maximized.
Where EU is expected utility, A is an available action, P is probability, S is a
state, U is utility, and C(S, A) represents the consequence that results when S is the
state and A the action. Each action is evaluated both for the likelihood of the
consequences it could produce and for the attractiveness of these outcomes. Usually,
the action with the highest expected utility among the set of available actions is the
choice. 11

10

Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press,
1960), p. 4.

11

Jame D. Morrows, pp. 22-23.

7
Now that we have considered the fundamental assumptions of game theory, we
can begin to describe the elements of a game. Some fundamental questions will be
raised and answered in this study: What do the concepts "rational actor," "strategy,"
"payoff' mean? What is a "game tree" and a "game matrix"? How do we conduct a
game?
Since this study attempts to apply game-theoretical models to international
conflicts, most attention is given to two-by-two models. I acknowledge that we may
enlarge the scope of observations and analyses by adding more relevant factors to the
basic model. Obviously, the list of factors related to our subject can be extended almost
indefinitely. Then, there would be no policy makers intelligent enough to decide
without serious consideration of such complicating factors. By contrast, a concise or
parsimonious model that renounces some secondary factors can help to clarify "some
of the subtle features of the interaction [among the players]-features which might
otherwise be lost in the maze of complexities of the highly particular circumstances in
which choice must actually be made." 12
To avoid getting involved in such a predicament, N-player models (N > 2) will
be set aside in highlighting mainland China-Taiwan relations, although some ideas
derived from them will contribute to our further understanding of international conflicts.
The reason we treat mainland China and Taiwan as two major players in the game is
that there have been conspicuous conflicting and/or mutual interests between both

12

Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,
1984), p. 20.

8

sides during the evolution of mainland China-Taiwan relations. Corresponding to
historical evidence, the likely leverage exerted by the potential third party like the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. on mainland China and Taiwan alike will be taken into account. In our
analysis, we view the role played by the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. as an ally (term player,
relatively temporary or permanent) to Taiwan or mainland China. The U.S. tends to
stand by Taiwan because the countries have similar values (capitalism, democratic
system, anti-Communists) or the U.S. considers its global strategies and vital interests
on Taiwan. By contrast, it is also possible for superpowers to keep good relationship
with both countries. In the 1970s, in an effort to deter Soviet expansionism the U.S.
sought to normalize the relations with the PRC. In terms of this understanding, the
levels of intervention and influence wielded by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., over time,
can be treated as significant factors that may or may not affect the setting of preference
orderings and the strategy combinations for Taiwan and mainland China as well.
In theory,

there are two major difficulties in the application of the N-person

model. According to Snyder, the researchers have to recognize a major player eager to
form a coalition among players. Then, What would be the criterion for selecting a
leader among players? Moreover, the researchers have to find a "decision point"--a
point in time when the binding agreement is determined and payoffs are awarded and
distributed among its members (players). Obviously, compared to two-by-two models,
N-person theory is vague about the location of this point (or equilibrium).
Typically, the types of game theory under the two-by-two framework are

9

separated into two categories: (I) the two-person zero-sum game, and (2) the two
person non-zero-sum game. Three classical game-theoretical models, Deadlock 13,
Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken, characterized as non-zero-sum games will be
introduced from at least two perspectives: their assumptions and characteristics. Also,
we will mention a couple of suggested solutions such as increasing communication or
decreasing misperception to Deadlock, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken conflict
situations which will lead us to evaluate relevant hypotheses concerning game theory,
game-theoretical models, and the applications of game-theoretical models to our case
study, mainland China-Taiwan relations.
To identify the characteristics and explanatory power of a certain type of model
for a specific conflict situation, a brief review of three previous case studies is
described and discussed. The three diverse models are the Southwest Pacific Conflict
of 1943 based on the framework of Deadlock, the Berlin Crisis of 1958-60 under
Prisoner's Dilemma, and Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 under Chicken. We, like game
theorists, assume that no superpower or third party will intervene in each nation's
choice. Besides, the government of each nation behaves as a single rational actor
struggling for the maximum interests. Then, through the applications of game-

The term, Deadlock, can be used widely to present any zero-sum game. For
descriptions of the deadlock ·game, see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Peking Interaction as
Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis, 1949-88," Issues and Studies, vol.
27, no. 10 (October 1991), pp. 73-74; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict
Among Nations (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 45.
13

10
theoretical models, we will lead our discussion to the major section of this study, i.e.,
the mainland China-Taiwan relations case study.
Methods and Hypotheses
Typically, the evolution of mainland China-Taiwan relations is divided into
three phases, i.e., 1949-78, 1979-86, and 1987~?. The relevant evidence suggested by
scholars to support such period assignment will be mentioned in the literature review.
In principle, we agree with this division of time periods. But, we will end the third
phase in the year 1995. The mainland China-Taiwan relations for the past four decades
in general could be divided into three individual phases: (1) the military confrontation
phase (1949-1978); (2) the peaceful competition phase (1979-86); and (3) the
premature cooperation phase (1987-1995).
Due to the improvement of diplomatic relations with other countries, especially
the establishment of official relations with the United States in January, 1979, mainland
China made great changes in its Taiwan policy. Mainland China proposed to Taiwan
that "three links" (mail, trade, and tourism) be opened and "four exchanges" (academic,
cultural, scientific, and athletic) be initiated. This policy transformation of mainland
China was viewed as the expression of a cooperative attitude with which mainland
China wanted to reduce bilateral hostility and create an opportunity for peaceful
reunification by negotiation between both sides.
Not until 1987 did Taiwan lift its ban on tourist trips to Hong Kong and Macao.

11
Also, for humanitarian reasons, the government began to allow Taiwan residents to
visit their relatives living in mainland China. Partly due to the demands for stable
economic growth, but also to the transformation of the political environment, the
government of Taiwan was compelled to adapt to the hard-line mainland policy. That is,
the government began to formulate and manage its coming trade relations with
mainland China in pursuit of new markets and cheap labor. However, they confined the
contact between both sides to political affairs and left aside though preliminary
exchanges were on the way. To be sure, the changes in exogenous or endogenous
conditions from time to time may force both countries to reevaluate the relations
between them under a new situation.
Foilowing the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, global conflicts became less
likely. The international community tends to constrain or assuage the infrequent
upheaval of local conflicts in specific regions such as the middle East or the Eastern
Europe in peaceful means. 14 However, it is highly possible that the evolution of
mainland China-Taiwan relations would damage regional and global security and
stability in the post-Cold War era if the relations get worse or a military conflict occurs.
On the other hand, due to the development of democratization in Taiwan, public
advocacy for Taiwan independence is no longer illegal. This tendency not only directly
encourage the stable growth of the opposition to the Democratic Progressive Party

Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, "Armed Conflict at the End of the Cold War,
1989-92," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 30, no. 3 (August 1993): 331-346.
14

12
(DPP), but it also indirectly retards the peaceful movement of across-Strait relations.
More negatively, it might provoke mainland China to use fm:ce against Taiwan, if
Taiwan declares independence. Besides, the pullout of the US troop from Japan, South
Korea, and the Philippines has decreased the capacity of the United States to function
as a mediator or protector in this region. Taiwan has been under the umbrella of the
United States since the outbreak of Korean War of 1950. Obviously, the waning power
of the United States has heightened the external threat to Taiwan, especially the
military threat from mainland China. More importantly, in recent years due to the
release of pressure from the Soviet Union, mainland China has greatly transferred its
military deposition from the northeast border to the southeast offshore provinces like
Fujian and Guangdong. 15 To be sure, facing such a dramatic transformation in the
international environment, Taiwan confronts a great opportunity as well as uncertainty
for the future. These endogenous and exogenous factors have forced Taiwan, a country
lacking in political resources, to put the first national priority on security rather than
sovereignty, to adjust the mainland policy, e.g., to search for cooperation instead of
defection with mainland China on across-Strait affairs, and at the same time to pursue
more "existing space" in the international community.
In a "White Paper on Cross-Strait Relations" published in July 1994, the
government on Taiwan announced that they would "no longer compete with Beijing

15

Cheng-yi Lin, "Taiwan's Security Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era," Issues and
Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (April 1995): 78-97.

13

the right to represent China in the international arena." 16 It is the first official
announcement that infers the transformation of national goals, i.e., they prefer security
to sovereignty. If that is true, one might be interested in the following question: What
would be mainland China's response to Taiwan transformation, especially in foreign
strategies and mainland policies?
No doubt, 1995 is a turning year for the relations across the Taiwan Strait.
During the first half of this year, based on the "flexible diplomacy" principle, Taiwan
worked hard to foster President Lee's return to his alma-mater--Cornell University.
Not until the end of May, did the Clinton administration, under great pressure from
Congress and the Press issue the visa to Lee and promise to mainland China that it is a
pure private visit, nothing more. To Taiwan, the meaning of Lee's US travel is
significant. On the one hand, it expresses Taiwan's strong resolution to struggle for
more international space. On the other hand, it makes some Taiwanese believe that
Taiwan may achieve international recognition eventually if it sticks to the road of
democratization. By contrast, according to the spirit of a white paper titled "The
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China"

17

of 1993, and for sovereignty's sake,

mainland China can not abide Taiwan to pursue international recognition. Also, it will
not allow other countries to interfere with Taiwan affairs for any reason. It goes

16

Free China Journal, January 29, 1993.

Kuo-cheng Sung, "One Peking's White Paper-'The Taiwan Question and
Reunification of China'," Issues and Studies, vol. 29, no. 9 (September 1993): 116.
17

14
without saying that mainland China's reaction to President Lee's US travel is inflexible.
In mid-June 1995, the major mainland Chinese media initiated a large-scale campaign
to reprove the so-called private visit of President Lee to the United States from June
7-12. In general, these critiques focused on accusing President Lee of seeking
independence for Taiwan. 18 At the same time, mainland China also protested the
American government's violation of the principle of the "one China policy" and the
spirit of three Sino-US joint communiqes. 19
To express its constant position on the "Taiwan issue", mainland China
unilaterally halted the regular meeting between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)
and Association For Relations Across Taiwan Straits (AFRATS)20 . Also, during July
and August, it held a series of missile exercises in the East sea, merely 120 miles away
from Taiwan. Obviously, using military maneuver as a threat, mainland China wants to
force Taiwan to adjust its working diplomacy and mainland China policy. Since the
evolution of mainland China-Taiwan in the future is uncertain, ending this case study in
1995 seems adequate.
If the pattern of interaction between both sides changed over time, how did it
happen? What are the causal factors? Which models are suitable to explain such a

18

see Beijing Review, (Jun. 26-Jul. 2 1995): 5; (July 3-9, 1995): 27; (Aug. 14-20,
1995): 12-13.
19

20

see Beijing Review, (Jun. 12-18, 1995): 7, 18; (Oct. 9-15): 4.

Two government-authorized organizations formulated by Taiwan and mainland
China respectively aim at dealing with the likely problems or conflicts occurring among
people-to-people exchanges from both sides.

15

happening? Does the current defecting relations make sense under the analysis of
game-theoretical models? To answer these questions, Tzeng-ho Bau, a professor at
National Taiwan University, submitted a workable model in which he separated the
interactions and relations between mainland China and Taiwan into three phases, i.e.,
1949-78, 1979-86, 1987-88, and assigned a specific game-theoretical model to each
phase. Typically, most literature dedicated to the analysis of international crises use
only one model, Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken, to decode a stable conflict situation
though this phenomenon may last a long period of time, like the Cold War between the
East and the West blocs.
Unlike most analysts who merely adopt one "dominant" model, Bau deals with
mainland China-Taiwan relations from the aspect of the dynamics of crisis. That is, he
takes advantage of game-theoretical models (Deadlock and Prisoner's Dilemma) to
describe and predict the evolution of the relations. This is an original application of
game-theoretical models to international confrontation though he does not explicitly
account for why the model is shifting over time. In addition, to conduct the game
theoretical analysis, he defined cooperation as "behavior characterized by a high degree
of compromise and a low degree of confrontation, and vice versa for defection.21"
Based on this definition (or criterion) , he classified relatively sufficient data such as
relevant events, announcements, and policies initiated or issued by both governments
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into two categories: (1) defection-oriented; and (2) cooperation-oriented. Then, these
two clusters can be utilized as the indicators representing choices of strategies, either
cooperation or defection, from both players.22

To be sure, Bau's criterion is

subjective. The reason for doing so probably is that terms such as cooperation and
defection constrained by historical context are difficult to define in the abstract. Snyder
also made an effort to clarify such vague terms. For example, he identified cooperation
(or cooperative strategy) as "a strategy of accepting the other player's demands in
whole or in part; making concessions, either all at once or gradually." By contrast,
defection is defined as "a strategy ofrefusing to comprise; standing firm on one's initial
demands, exception for minor adjustments.23" Obviously, Snyder's definition of
cooperation or defection covers more relevant elements than Bau's. We acknowledge
in the real world that many diplomatic interactions contain both elements of
cooperation and defection. That is, these moves would be located somewhere between
cooperation and defection if we employ a two-poles continuous scale. Based on the
preceding realization, in this study we will classify data in reference to the criteria set
by Bau and Snyder as well.
Mainland China and Taiwan alike, as rational actors, are eager to adopt actions
to maximize their own primary interests. Due to the practical difficulty in reading
policy makers' minds and to illustrate the real policy-making processes on both sides,
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document research like Bau's study would be one practicable way. However,
conducting the documentary method, researchers may encounter the predicament of
how to avoid the bias-oriented selections and descriptions of data which fit our models
or hypotheses well and how to accommodate and explain exceptions? To be sure, it
occurs in our case study. For example, in selecting a specific phase, 1979-86, while we
collect data and label each as cooperative or defecting, we find that the strategies
selected by both sides are not constant, neither cooperative nor defecting in total.
Facing the players' shift in strategies, game theorists may wonder whether they are
applying the correct game model to a given phase. To solve this problem, we can
introduce the concept of mixed strategies though it may or may not work as we expect.
Since our case study covers a longer time period than Bau's, and because more
data are available, I will try to make some necessary and significant modification to
Bau's models, especially in phase division and game-theoretical models applications. In
principle, we will go with most of Bau's analysis on the first two phases though I
leave room for discussion with respect to the payoffs assigned for both sides in the
second phase; as for the third phase, I will extend the time period from 1988 to 1995
and apply Chicken as a model instead of Prisoner's Dilemma used by Bau.
The reason for this modification is Taiwan's change in preference orderings
caused the transformation of the structure in the game, i.e., as a model Chicken is more
acceptable than Prisoner's Dilemma in this situation. In addition, we remain skeptical
about the solution of "tit for tat" that Bau proposes for the second and the third phases.
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The hypothesis--the more vulnerable party (like Taiwan) is always sensitive to any
possible change of policy by its opponent (like mainland China)-- initiated but not
developed by Bau, will be used as one of major assumptions (up to the third phase
Taiwan is more seriously concerned with its security than sovereignty) to reinforce our
argument that Taiwan is compelled to play Chicken while mainland China can freely
shift its strategy between cooperation and defection.
Before moving into our case study, I will review and examine a couple of
hypotheses from the broad perspective of game theory. Also, I will use these
hypotheses to explain and analyze mainland China-Taiwan relations, such as:
1. Collective rationality is more workable on increasing interest to the players
than individual rationality in an interest-conflict game like Prisoner's Dilemma or
Chicken. Cooperation is preferable to defection.
2. The more opportunity for the players to communicate before or during a
game; the more possibility for both sides to choose a cooperative strategy instead of
defecting one. For example, due to the exchanges between both sides after 1987, the
mainland China-Taiwan relations moved the peaceful competition phase into the
premature cooperation phase.
3. Decision-makers are more liable to search for cooperation in the context of a
repeated game than a one-shot game.
4. The players can be encouraged or forced to adopt cooperation while the
structure of the game is changed. For example, mainland China began to play a
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Prisoner's Dilemma game instead of a Deadlock after 1979. Change of attitudes in
mainland China on the one hand caused the reorganization of the payoff matrix yet on
the other hand directly encouraged Taiwan to adjust its strategies and preference
ordering in a new game.
5. Compared to Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken is more conducive to cooperation
because the players in Chicken will suffer costly penalties if they decide to defect with
one another.
In addition, I consider two methodological elements, i.e., the subjective
recognition of the players and the objective constraint of the conflict situation, when
we assign a game-theoretical model to a given situation. The reason to select Chicken
in comparing the basic framework for the explanation of mainland China-Taiwan
relations in the third phase is that Chicken is much more conducive to promote a
binding agreement to cooperate on both sides due to costly penalties (e.g., war). Also,
Taiwan is liable to adhere to the cooperative strategy (i.e., play Chicken) because of
lack of political resources and the consideration of security as well.
To enhance our understanding of mainland China-Taiwan relations, this case
study is dedicated to answering questions such as: Is there any change of foreign
policies (or strategies) in both countries during the past four decades? What kinds of
factors cause the change of relationship between both sides? Could game-theoretical
models help us to find any characteristic of the interaction when we compare the past
to the current experience? Through the study of the characteristics of game theory and
game-theoretical models, we suggest the following hypothesis: Chicken is more
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suitable compared to Prisoner's Dilemma in analyzing mainland China-Taiwan relations
in the post-Cold War era.

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
Before gomg further with the applications of game-theoretical models to
mainland China-Taiwan relations, we should take a closer look at game theory. In this
chapter, I introduce some general definitions of game theory. The fundamental
concepts derived from the definitions like rationality and expected utility will be
described. Also, to clarify the intimate association between game theory and the
rational choice theory, I briefly contrast them to point out how game theory develops
from the rational choice theory. In this chapter, I also discuss the characteristics and
· elements of a game, the vernacular of game theory (i.e., game tree and game matrix),
and the types of two person games.
Definitions of Game Theory
Game theory can be defined as the study of conflict and cooperation between
rational decision-makers using concise game-theoretical models.24 There are at least
three significant elements within this definition: (1) we can calculate the consequence
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of behavior adopted by players and predicted using game theory; (2) players are
supposed to oppose each other in different interests; (3) players in a game are
intelligent, especially rational as to their own goals and actions. McMillan identifies
game theory as "the study of rational behavior in situations involving
interdependence." By interdependence, we mean that what they do will affect the
players in the game and the others' responses during the strategy making processes.
Put another way, the outcome of the game depends on each player's action-- no one
individual has full control over what happens.
According to McMillan, the players are aware of these interdependences so, to
a certain extent, that might constrain their reactions. In addition, the concept of
interdependence implies a certain competition (or conflict situation) among the game
players. Due to the relationship (interdependence) among the players, a rational action
in a game must be derived from a prediction of others' responses. That is, by putting
yourself in the other player's position and predicting what kind of action he will adopt,
one, as a rational actor, can react with best action.25 Rapoport argues that game theory
is not dedicated to describe how actual people make decisions in conflict of interests
situations; rather it is intended to explain "how certain idealized actors, called rational
players, can be expected to make decisions in such situations. "26
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To be sure, such a statement as this may invite a certain suspicion concerning
the power of game theory to explain the real world. That is, game theory may be
subject to serious criticisms such as: the models are formulated to be too
simple/unrealistic to represent all possible states of the world. If so, is there any
advantage of game theory which has attracted political scientists to study and apply it?
By highlighting the players' preference orderings and strategy interactions, game
theory, to a certain extent, may increase the chance that we will identify the
fundamental conflicts among the actors. Other factors that help increase our
understanding are (a) knowing the actors' preference orderings and strategies, (b) how
a rational actor achieves his maximum benefits (or expected goals) while he considers
other actors, and (c) why a rational actor could and should respond in particular way.
In other words, we can say that the primary contribution of game theory is not only to
study

the conflict of interest and conflicting behavior in terms of a concise

framework in which a strategic interaction is simplified; but also to predict what the
players will do in the game, and thus generate testable hypotheses.
To capture the relevant characteristics of game-theoretical models, it is worth
referring to two fundamental assumptions concerning game theory, i.e., (1) the
concept of rationality, and (2) expected utility (or utility theory).
Concept of Rationality
Game theory as the most highly developed rational model of politics is based
on the assumption of rationality. Rationality is an ambiguous concept which has
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generated controversy and confusion in social science, especially in political science.
In his book, Theory of Political Coalitions, Riker characterizes the concept of
rationality as follows:
The rationality assumption asserts that there is something about people
that makes them behave in a regular way, just as in physical science
that mechanical assumption is made that there is something about
things that assures us they will move regularly. In both cases there is
an assumption that things behave in a regular way.27
Riker' s identification of rationality is such that we could label someone or his
behavior rational if he behaves in a regular way. Moreover, "a regular way" may
imply that either the actors or the outsiders learning the lessons from others'
experience know exactly what to do under a similar situation. In contrast, Fiorina's
definition of rationality goes further. He argues that the assumption of rational
behavior means no more than the notion that "individuals engage in maximizing
behavior." Besides, the individual can choose the alternatives available to him which
would return the maximum "expected benefits" under the minimum costs. 28 Rapoport
has a similar perception of rationality stating that we call an individual rational if he
takes into account the possible consequences of each course of action open to him; if
he is aware of a certain preference ordering among the consequences and accordingly
chooses the course of action that, in his estimation, is likely to lead to the most
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preferred consequence. 29 Also, Dahl has his own recognition of rationality as "an
action is rational to the extent that it is correctly designed to maximize goal
achievement, given the goal in question and the real world as it exists. "30
The description implies that rational behavior consists of at least three critical
elements (1) intention to maximize primary interests, (2) usage of the best means, and
(3) goal-oriented behavior. In addition, we assume a rational means is recognized as
the most efficient instrument that would help an actor to achieve a selected goal. We
never label results as rational, only the means to achieve the ends. We evaluate an
action as rational or not according to the choice of means available to achieve a
certain goal. 31
What is the scope of rationality? Usually, rationality leads us to what we
ought and can do for the sake of attainment of our expected goals. Which actions will
be labeled rational by what kind of criteria? To address this question, we should first
scrutinize the optimizing relationship between the desires and the beliefs of the actors.
That is, a rational action should be the best way of satisfying the actor's desires based
on his beliefs. Or, in Olson's words, an individual's actions are rational when his
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objectives are "pursued by means that are efficient and effective for achieving these
objectives."32
Borrowing Elster's model, Figure 1 below represents the interaction among
these concepts.33
Action

Desires

Beliefs

il

Evidence
Figure 1.

The Interaction Among Concepts.

The procedure for the evolution of rational action is demonstrated in the
following model (Figure 2). 34
In principle, rational action consists of three relevant operations ( 1) finding the
best action based on given beliefs and desires; (2) formulating the best-grounded
belief derived from given evidence; and (3) collecting the right amount of evidence
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for given desires and prior beliefs. 35
Achieve Y

t

Doing X

t

Intention to do X in order to achieve Y

Desire for Y
Figure 2.

Belief that X brings about Y

The Evolution of Rational Action.

To be sure, the characteristics of the rational choice theory can be summarized
as (a) theorists assume people have goals that they attempt to achieve, (b) theorists
assume people have some freedom of choice, (c) theorists assume that individuals
choose actions they believe will achieve their goals, and (d) theorists deliberately
simplify and abstract reality in their models. 36
In their article, "The Limits of Rational Theory," Goldfield and Gilbert also
identified several assumptions for rational choice theory. First, they contend that
individuals have relatively fixed or constant preferences. The preferences are
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invariant and exogenous. The preferences are ranked in a consistent, hierarchical
preference structure. In other words, an individual's preferences are viewed as
expressions of his perceived self-interest, measurable in quantitative units, like money.
Second, they note that individuals act to maximize their preferences (or self-interest).
While, the parameters of choice which involve preference structures, a utility function
can represent the feasible set of options, means, and costs. That is, to understand
human actions as rational is to understand them as actions by individuals to maximize
their utility functions. In addition, in order to achieve their goals with other similarly
rational individuals who have their own well-defined self-interest, individuals
attempting to maximize their self-interest compete and cooperate. This complicated
web of interaction among actors will form or reach an equilibrium. 37
Like the rational choice approach, game theory makes it possible to apply the
concept of rationality to the real world. Game theory assumes that the actors
confronting any real world conflict situation will behave rationally. Next, game theory
describes the essential characteristics of a given situation, especially through concise
game models. Finally, game theory helps us to explain and predict why, what, and
how the actors behave.
So far, we have confirmed that game theory is based on the assumption of
rational actors. We may raise relevant questions such as: What would happen in a
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game if the players act rationally? Could rational behavior, in practice, guarantee an
expected (or rational) outcome in return? In his book, An Economic Theory of
Democracy, Downs says "in reality, men are not always selfish, even in politics. They
frequently do what appear to be individually irrational because they believe it is
socially rational...."38
His notion with respect to rationality points out a specific perspective, i.e.,
individual rationality versus collective rationality. More literature about this contrast
will be posed in a latter section dedicated to non-zero sum game models.
Expected Utility
In principle, game theorists assume that each individual is rational and eager
to maximize the expected value (or utility) of his own payoff, measured on some
utility scale.39 In this spirit, Fishburn notes that "expected utility has served for more
than a generation as the preeminent model of rational preferences in decision making
under conditions of risk."40 In other words, We can apply game-theoretical analysis
"only if the payoffs entered in the game matrix actually represent utilities given on an
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interval scale.' 4 1
What distinguishes game-theoretical models from other models of rational
choice is that the outcome assumes to be contingent on the choices of more than one
player. That is, the preferences of other players, and choices consistent with these
preferences, must be explicitly considered when one chooses an optimal action. In
addition, game theorists assume that the players have preferences to a set of outcomes
which are fixed and that change in the situation and the information available to the
players. By choosing the outcomes carefully, "shifts in preferences" are shifts in
preferences among actions, rather than outcomes. 42 The player preferences in a game
are expressed on a utility scale.
Ordinal and interval scales are frequently used in game theory. To say that a
person's preferences can be measured on an ordinal scale simply means that they are
in an order. In other words, the various possible outcomes of a situation can be laid
out along a line so that for any two outcomes the preferred one lies to the left of the
other. 43 To say that an individual's preferences fit an interval scale means that those
preferences satisfy an ordinal scale and the individual can give consistent statements
of preference between probabilistic lotteries. An ordinal scale can represent the notion
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that one thing is preferred to another but no one thing is preferred by a wide or narrow
margin. By contrast, the interval scale puts an exact numerical value on the amount by
which one is preferred to another.44 A descending sequence can represent ordinal
preferences of numbers. The highest number is assigned to the most preferred
outcome, the second-largest number to the next outcome in the preference order, and
so on down to the least preferred outcome.
We call these numbers utilities, and the function that maps from consequences
to numbers that represent an individual's preferences over those outcomes is a utility
function. With ordinal preferences, the larger the number the better the outcome,
however, the difference between the numbers assigned to two outcomes in
meaningless.45 Also, Axelrod argues that the unit points bestowed are arbitrary. The
utility scale is an interval like the scale on a thermometer. The utility is an index of
the preferences of the player himself and, in theory at least, is measured by observing
the choices the player makes when confronted with diverse altematives.46
According to the assumption of utility theory, the subject's preferences among
alternatives come prior to our numerical characterization of them. That is, we do not
want to slip into saying that a player prefers A to B because A has the higher utility;
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rather, because A is preferred to B, we assign A the higher utility.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern formulated utility theory based on the
following assumptions:
1. Given two alternatives, a person either prefers one to the other or is
indifferent.
2. Certain well-defined chance events having probabilities attached to
them are manipulated according to the rules of the probability
calculus.48
Utility is a measure of an actor's preferences over the outcomes that reflects
his or her willingness to take risks to achieve desired outcomes and avoid undesirable
outcomes. The relationship between preferences and utility function is that a preferred
option will have a higher expected utility, i.e., to a rational actor, what he is eager to
do is maximize his utility based on his preferences. If so, how does a utility function
predict actions? What is its relationship with the expected utility? According to the
utility function formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern, any decision problem
can be described formally as (a) a set of acts,"A," one of which will be chosen as the
decision.(b) A set of states of the world, "S." The states are mutually exclusive and
Only one can occur, and one state must occur. The" world" is defined to encompass
all matters about the problem beyond the control of the decider. An event is a subset
of the states.(c) A set of consequences or outcomes, "C," with one consequence for
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each pair of acts and states.(d) A preference ordering to the consequences, "P." These
preferences are assumed to be complete, transitive, and fixed.
We can calculate the expected utility for an action by multiplying the
probability of each state's occurring by the utility of the outcome that results from that
state and the action, then summing these products over all the possible states. The
available action with the highest expected utility is the choice. In mathematics, we
have the following:

EU (A)=

L

P (S) U [(S, A)] and choose A such that EU (A) is maximized.

all S

Characteristics of a Game
Rapoport defines the cardinal characteristics of a game:
1. Sets of decision makers are called players. A set consists of at least two
players.
2. At specified instances, one or more players must decided by choosing
among a specified set of alternatives. These decisions determine the resulting
situations of the game. Thus, a play of a game is a sequence of situations.
3. Each situation, in tum, determines which of the players is to make the next
decision ("move") and the range of choices available.
4. Certain specified situations define the end of the particular play of the
game.
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5. A situation in which a particular play of a game ends is called an outcome
of the game. Associated with each outcome is a set of payoffs, positive or negative
numbers, one awarded to each player. The payoffs represent gains or losses.
6. A rational player is one who, having taken into account all the information
available to him by the rules of the game, makes choices in a way that maximizes the
actual or the statistically expected payoff to accrete to him (and to him only) in the
outcome of the game.49
To be sure, a game consists of players as rational actors, alternatives (or
strategies), and payoffs. A strategy can be identified as a complete description of how
one will behave under every possible circumstance. 50 A rational player will adopt a
strategy (or adapt a working strategy) conducive to achieve his selected goal before
playing a game or during a game. Rapoport's statement implies that the structure of
the game would constrain the players' strategies and payoffs. Also, the preceding
move can constrain the next decision.
This proposition reminds us of the difference between one-shot games and
iterated games. Overall, in a one-shot game, each player searches for a dominant
strategy, if any, and plays the game tough. The outcomes for the players are either
wins or losses as there is only one chance to play, and any retaliation is impossible.

49

50

Anatol Rapoport, The 2X2 Game, p. 4.

Morton D. Davis, Game Themy--A Nontechnical Introduction (New York: Basic
Books Press, 1970), p. 10.

35
By contrast, in an iterated game, each player may try to cooperate for the sake of
collective benefits and to restrain oneself from adopting defecting strategy for the
sake of avoiding retaliation. Compared to one-shot games, iterated games are inclined
to promote cooperation, especially in non-zero sum game situations, like Prisoner's
Dilemma and Chicken.
Hamburger also identifies four basic ingredients of a game-theoretical analysis:
the players, their options, the possible results, and the players' preferences among
those results. 51 A game-theoretical analysis pays attention to questions such as:
Whom has decisions to make? What are the different options available? What will be
the results of the various possible combinations of choices? Which results are
preferred by whom?
These relevant questions in practice can be described and discussed by the
languages of game theory, called game trees and matrices.
Tree Descriptions
Game 1: Card Game
At the beginning of this game, player 1 and 2 each put a dollar in the pot.
Player 1 draws a card from a shuffled deck in which half the cards are red (diamonds
and hearts) and half are black (clubs and spades). Player 1 privately looks at his card
and decides to raise or fold. If Player 1 folds then he or she shows the card to Player 2
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and the game ends. Then, Player 1 takes the money in the pot if the card is red, but
Player 2 takes the money in the pot if the card is black. If Player 1 raises then he or
she adds another dollar to the pot and Player 2 must decide whether to meet or pass. If
Player 2 passes, then the game ends and Player 1 takes the money in the pot. If Player
2 meets, then he or she also must add another dollar to the pot, and the Player 1 takes
the money in the pot if the card is red, and Player 2 takes the money in the pot if the
card is black.

Meet
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Figure 3.
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Card Game (1).

Figure 3 is a tree diagram that shows the possible events that could occur in
this game. The tree consists of a set of branches, each that connects two points called
nodes. The leftmost node in the tree is the root of the tree and represents the
beginning of the game. There are six nodes in the tree. These nodes are called
terminal nodes and represent the possible ways that the game could end. The
outcomes to each player are allocated at terminal nodes respectively. A path of
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branches represents each possible sequence of events that could occur in the game
from the root to one of these terminal nodes. When they play the game, they call the
path that represents the actual sequence of events that will occur the path of play. The
goal of game-theoretical analysis is to try to predict the path of play. We give the node
a label "O" (zero) if chance determines the event not by a player. In Figure 1, the root
has label "O" because the color of the card that Player 1 draws is determined by
chance. Each of the two branches following the root has probability .5, because half
of the cards in the deck are red and half are black. A non-terminal node with a label
other than zero is a decision node. When the next branch in the path of play would be
determined by the player named by the label, e.g., "1" represents decisions make by
Player 1.
In Figure 4, each decision node has two labels, separated by a decimal point.
To the left the decimal point, we write the player label which indicates the name of
the player who controls the node. The right of the decimal point, we write an
information label, which shows the information state of the player when he moves at
this node. So the label "I .a" indicates a node where Player 1 moves under the
information state "a," and the label "2.0" indicates a node where Player 2 moves
under the information state "O." In addition, Player! 's information state "a" is the
state of having a red card, Player 1's information state "b" is the state of having a
black card, and Player 2's information state "O" indicates the state of knowing that
Player 1 has raised. The only significance of the information labels is to express sets
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of nodes that can not be distinguished by the player who controls them. Thus, because
Player 1 's nodes have diverse information labels but Player 2 's nodes have the same
information labels. This situation implies that Player 1 can distinguish his two nodes
when he moves, but Player 2 can not distinguish her two nodes when she moves.
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Compared to Figure 4, Figure 5 indicates a game with prefect information. A
game is one of prefect information if each player's location on the game tree can be
inferred from the preceding decisions. In our case, Player 2's nodes have different
information about Player 1's moves. That is, Player 2 can immediately decide which
strategies to adopt when she gets the information that Player 1 has raised because he
draws a red or black card.
In general, we can easily identify three features of game trees: (1) players have
more than one move or strategy; (2) moves are not made simultaneously; and (3) the
results of all preceding moves are always made public so that these are games of
"prefect information. "52
Matrix Descriptions
Game 2: Matching Pennies
In this two-person game each Player takes a penny and places it either head-up
or tail-up and covers it so the other Player cannot see it. Both player's pennies are
then uncovered simultaneously. One player is called Matchmaker. This player gets
both pennies if they show the same face (both heads or tails). The other player is
called Variety-seeker. This player gets the pennies if they show opposite faces (one
head and one tail).
A simple matrix can represent the entire description of Game 2 containing all
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the key information. 53 Thus in Matrix 1, Matchmaker may choose the top row (heads)
or the bottom row (tails). Variety-seeker may pick the left or right column.
Variety-seeker
Tails
Heads
Heads
Matchmaker
Tails

Figure 6.
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-1

+l

Matrix 1: Matching Pennies.
.

.

Their two choices together determine a box or cell of the matrix. For example,
if both pick tails, the result is the lower-right cell, in which we find the number "+1."
This number is the payoff to Matchmaker, showing that Matchmaker wins one penny
in this game (because he keeps his own penny, his net change in wealth is +1). This
parlor game is a zero-sum game, since money is neither created nor destroyed. The
matrix has been made from Matchmaker's point of view, so that, for example, it has
"-1" when he loses. Giving payoffs only for the row-choosier in a zero-sum game is
conventional, and this has been done in Matrix 1. Since Matchmaker's loss is Variety
seeker's gain, one could deduce Variety-seeker's payoffs simply by replacing plus
signs with minus signs and vice versa in Matrix 1. Notice that the matrix clearly
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displays the names of the players, the options available to them, and the way in which
those options can interest to give results. In addition, the preference orderings to each
player should be considered because a rational player is supposed to choose the
strategy based on his preferences.
Compared to game trees, matrices have been used to represent simultaneous
choices for two players, while trees have merely allowed us to express a succession of
moves, usually with a player knowing everything done up to the time of particular
decision.54 In other words, game trees can display the relatively integral decision
making process by containing information with respect to players' moves.
Translating Trees Into Matrices
In Figure 7 (game tree), Player A has two possible strategies, a and b. In
contrast to Player B, complete contingency plan (strategy) is more complicated
because Player B make sure what he will do in response to Player A and do not have
any information what Player A will do. Player B's possible strategies are for the
following: (Figure 7)
The matrix 2 that corresponds to game tree is found by pairing up the choices
of the two players. For example, if Player A adopts strategy a and Player B has left
instructions to use the strategy d-e, the result is the Player B ends up actually using
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branch e of the tree, so the payoff is D.55
(1) Strategy 1, c-e

C

if player A has adopted a, then choose c;
if player A has adopted b, then choose e.
(2) Strategy 2, c-f
defined similarly as above.
(3) Strategy 3, d-e
defined similarly as above.
(4) Strategy 4, d-f
defined similarly as above.
Figure 7.

C

C)

D
E

A
b

OF

Game Tree.

c-e

Player B
c-f
d-e

d-f

a

C

C

D

D

b

E

F

E

F

Player A

Figure 8.

Matrix 2: Translating Game Tree Into Matrix.
The Types of Games for Two-Person

There is no one universal model which can represent all games under diverse
conditions. Overall, two-person games are designed under the consideration of
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payoffs, the number of games, and information.
According to these elements, two-person games can be created in different
types such as: (a) two-person, zero-sum, finite game of perfect information; (b) two
person, zero-sum, unlimited game of perfect information; (c) two-person, zero-sum,
finite game without perfect information; (d) two-person, zero-sum, unlimited game
without perfect information; (e) two-person, non-zero-sum, finite game of prefect
information; (f) two-person, non-zero-sum, unlimited game of perfect information; (g)
two-person, non-zero-sum, finite game without perfect information; (h) two-person,
non-zero-sum, unlimited game without perfect information.
In a two-by-two game, either zero-sum or non-zero-sum, one player or both
may or may not have a dominant strategy. If there is one, then the game is strictly
determined because those players with a dominant strategy will choose it.
Matrix 3 indicates a game with dominant strategies for both players. The top
row is a dominant strategy for Player A since 5 exceeds 1 and 4 exceeds -2. The right
column is a dominant strategy for Player B since -4 exceeds -5 and 2 exceeds -1 (this
is a zero-sum game, Player B's payoffs are the negative of those for Player A).
Player B
5

4

1

-2

Player A

Figure 9.

Matrix 3: Game With Dominant Strategies.

The major difference between a zero-sum game and a non-zero-sum game is
that in a zero-sum game the payoff to one player is at the cost of the other player.
Thus, the net payoff is always zero. Besides, as we mention above, if the game is
played only once, i.e., a one-shot game, then it is expected that both players will adopt
a dominant strategy that could maximize his expected utilities or payoffs. By contrast,
if the game is played more than once, i.e., an iterated game, then choosing a
cooperative strategy to increase payoffs is possible for both players, especially in a
non-zero-sum game.
Conclusion
The goal of game-theoretical analysis is an attempt to predict how the
participants as rational players will decide under a conflict situation. Based on the
assumption of rationality, game theory shares a couple of similar features with the
rational choice theory. Elster has pointed out these common characteristics, and
included: (a) both theories assume that people have expected goals according to
personal preference orderings; (b) both theories assume that individuals choose
actions that they believe will achieve their goals; (c) both theories tend to simplify
and abstract the reality in their models. In addition, game theory concentrates on
decision interdependence among the players while the rational choice theory focuses
on personal decision.
The concept of expected utility initiated by von Neumann and Morgenstern is
another central assumption in game theory. By combining utility theory with
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rationality, game theorists can show the following hypothesis: the players' actions are
determined by their preference orderings in which the highest rank of preference is
assigned the largest utility, i.e., they will choose the action that will bring the largest
utility in return, when other things are equal. In this chapter, we have used Rapoport's
analysis to describe the relevant characteristics and elements of a game. Also, we
introduced two general ways to make up a game; that is, by game tree and game
matrix. Finally, we recognize the most common types of games for two-person so that
we might introduce three well-known game models in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

GAME-THEORETICAL MODELS
Introduction
Games, in principle, can be divided into two types: zero-sum and non zero
sum. The difference between both clusters lies in the pattern of payoffs. Due to the
lack of mutual interests, the payoffs for the players in zero-sum games are assigned in
accordance with the principle of zero-sum; the more one obtains, the more the others
lose. By contrast, the players in non zero-sum games may cooperate with one another
to escalate individual payoffs because the payoffs derived from cooperation
overweighs that from bilateral defection.
Typically, Deadlock as a game model, focusing on total conflict among the
players, describes general zero-sum games. Unlike Deadlock, Prisoner's Dilemma
and Chicken, two well-known game models for non zero-sum games, are used to
explain the situation in which interest and conflict are mixed. In this chapter, I
distinguish between zero-sum and non zero-sum game models. Also, I describe
various solutions to game-theoretical models such as the "tit for tat" strategy and
mixed strategies.

Before our introduction of major game-theoretical models, a

couple of relevant concepts are worth addressing, e.g., equilibrium, Nash equilibrium,
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saddle points, the minimax (or maximin) principle.
Equilibrium, Nash Equilibrium and Saddle Points
In theory, the concept of equilibrium displays the notion or rational actions in
a given situation in which each rational actor adopts his best strategy available,
restrained by others and the structure of the game he faces.56 Besides, an equilibrium
can be regarded as a prediction for a specific situation concerning the choices of the
actors and the corresponding outcomes. Ordeshook contends that this prediction
always fit into the type "if people's preferences are ...then the only choices and
outcomes that can endure are...." Put another way, the function of the concept of
equilibrium is that it can replace both "journalistic interpretations of events and
statistical correlations between environmental factors and political outcomes as
explanations. "57
The game-theoretical concept of equilibrium represents "a certain meshing
of everyone's social structure: no actor has any incentive to act differently at an
equilibrium, which means that there is no tendency to structural alteration."58
The work of Nash influences the idea of equilibrium (1950). Nash
equilibrium, in principle, can be viewed as a perfect equilibrium if it is stable with
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respect to small perturbations in the players' strategies, i.e., if each player's
equilibrium strategy is a best reaction to the opponent's strategy and to some slight
perturbation of that strategy.59 An optimal strategy for a certain player, according to
Harsanyi, is recognized as a best reply to the other players' strategies if it could
maximizes this player's payoff so long as the other players' strategies are kept
constant. Then, a given strategy pair (containing exactly one strategy for each player)
is called an equilibrium point (or Nash equilibrium).60 In general, a Nash equilibrium
occurs if there is a potentially self-reinforcing agreement; therefore, each individual
"does what is best for her given what others do."61
"Saddle points" initiated by Rapoport, is another significant game-theoretical
concept related to equilibrium though not as popular as Nash equilibrium. The center
of a saddle is the lowest point on the horse's back in the horse's longitudinal plane,
i.e., as one moves from front to back, (and at the same time the highest point in the
plane perpendicular to the horse's move, i.e., as one slides from side to side). In other
words, the saddle point is simultaneously a minimum and a maximum. In a game
matrix, a saddle point may be recognized if the cell is both the smallest in the
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corresponding row and the largest in the corresponding columns. A saddle point is
62

viewed as an equilibrium, especially in zero-sum games.
For example, Matrix 4 (Figure 10) represents a game with a saddle point and a
stable outcome as well. Neither player has a dominant strategy. Focus on the center
cell in which Player A would get 2 while Player B gets -2. What will happen if Player
A alters his choice while Player B sticks to the center column? The consequence will
be that Player A gets O or 1, both less than 2. To Player A, no changing his choice is
wise. In contrast, if Player B alters his choice while Player A sticks to the center row,
then Player B gets -3 or -4, both less than -2. Obviously, staying is wise for Player B
(the center cell). Here, the center cell is named as a saddle point.
Player B

5
Player A

3

-2
Figure 10.

0

-3

2

4

1

6

Matrix 4: Game With a Saddle Point.

The idea of equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, and Rapoport's saddle points all
stem from the fundamental assumption that in a so-called equilibrium situation no

Anatol Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory--The Essential Ideas (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 60-62.
62
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actor wishes to change his behavior on his own. That is, behavior at an equilibrium is
stable in the sense that no actor given his current position and knowledge, can
improve his own position on his own though an equilibrium is not assumed to be fair
or balanced to the actors or desirable according to any ethical criteria. 63 A Pareto
optimal outcome will come out with an equilibrium. 64
Minimax or Maximin Principle
The minimax principle is derived from the concept of saddle points. Suppose
there exists a number "V", a pure strategy (a maximin strategy) for Player A which
will guarantee him on achieving at least V, and at the same time the other pure
strategy (a minimax strategy) for Player B, which will guarantee that Player A gets at
most V. Also, these strategies are in equilibrium when any pair of pure strategies
produce a maximin and a minimax strategy for Player A and Player B respectively. 65
Now, if Player A adopts a maximin strategy while Player B chooses a minimax
strategy in response, then both players follow the minimax (or maximin) principle in a
game.
In his book, The Analysis of International Relations, Deutsch identifies the
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minimax principle as a workable strategy for the players in a given situation in which
a player assumes that his opponent will be as bright as possible and will play to win
as much as he can. There often exists several strategies available to our player, by
which he can hold his losses to a minimum and the winning of his opponent. Put
another way, the distribution of all possible outcomes of the game for the two players
much have at least one "saddle point" at which the minimum of one player's maxima
and the maximum of his opponent minima coincide which such a strategy can
attain.66 In short, the minimax principle means that each player should attempt to
maximize the minimum gain that can be assured or to minimize the maximum loss
that needs to be sustained.
Consider Matrix 5 (Figure 11). Imagine that you are Player A. What should
you do?
Usually, one possible strategy is to find the highest possible payoff by
picking the row in which it occurs. In Matrix 5, this is top row. On the other hand,
you may choose the strategy that will guarantee a minimum payoff. If so, the second
row is the safest because it guarantees a minimum payoff 2. The other possible
strategy is called the maximin principle and works as follows: First, find the smallest
payoff in each row; 0, 2, 0, and 1 in order from top to bottom. These numbers are
called the row minima. Second, pick the largest, or maximum, of these numbers.
Then, the selected number is the maximum of the minima, or "maximin." The
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maximin payoff in Matrix 5 is 2, in the second row, and the row is therefore called
maximin strategy.
Dongherty and Pfaltzgraff propose five features of the minimax principle (1)
it applies only to zero-sum games, (2) it is proof against information leakage, (3) it is
useful and normative only against an opponent who is assumed to be playing a
rational game, (4) the utility of the minimax strategy is validated in a series of plays,
not in a one-shot game, and (5) it is a unexciting, no-fun strategy. Nevertheless, it
may be advisable.67
Player B
4

3

1

0

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

0

3

2

2

1

Player A

Figure 11.

Matrix 5: Minimax or Maximin Principle.
A Zero-Sum Game: Deadlock

Unlike Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken, Deadlock is not a specific model with

67

Dongherty, pp. 510-511.

a vivid story. For the sake of discrimination from non-zero-sum models, any zero-sum
game is entitled Deadlock. That is, Deadlock can display the significant
characteristics of any zero-sum game according to some fundamental as.sumptions.
For example, Matrix 6 (Figure 12) illustrates a Deadlock game. 68 The numbers
assigned in the cells are based on the players' preference orderings, not on how much
utility. The number "1" represents the most preferred outcome. There is a dominant
strategy to each player. For example, Player A's dominant strategy is the low row,
defection (D) because "1" is preferred to "3" and "2" is preferred to "4". Also, there is
a saddle point or equilibrium at (2, 2) because Player A nor Player B can improve his
payoff by shifting his strategy.
Player B
C

C
Player A

D
3

1

4

3

4
1
Figure 12.

2
2

Matrix 6: Deadlock Game.

Such an equilibrium in a Deadlock game is characterized as very stable. First,
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neither player can force the other to accept the payoff which would be the best for one
and the worst for the other. Second, the preference ordering of each player under the
dominant strategy (D) is better than under the alternative strategy, cooperation (C).
To be sure, constrained under the structure of the game cooperation is a less attractive
and rational strategy than defection in this game.
Non Zero-Sum Games: Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken
Prisoner's Dilemma Model
Typically, the structure of the game is illustrated thus: The police arrest and
placed two persons suspected of committing a crime together in separate cells. Each
knows the possible consequences of his actions. There are three possible
consequences for both: ( 1) If one suspect confesses, and his partner does not, then the
confessor turns state's evidence and goes free and the other goes to jail for ten years-
a serious penalty; (2) If both suspects confess, then they both go to jail for five years;
(3) If both suspects remain silent, then they both go to jail for one year for carrying
concealed weapons-- a less charge. In addition, this game is based on the assumption
that there is no "honor among thieves" and each suspect's sole concern is his own
self-interest. Each suspect behaves as a rational actor. The game is displayed in
Matrix 7 (Figure 13).
Prisoner's Dilemma proceeds by means of analyzing the point of view of one
suspect. When Suspect I decides whether to confess or not, he does not have any
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information regarding what his partner will do. Nevertheless, he can consider each of
his partner's alternatives and anticipate the effect of each of them on himself. For
example, assume his partner confesses; Suspect I must either confess and go to jail for
five year, or remain silence and go to jail for ten years.

On the other hand, if his

partner does not confess, Suspect I can win his freedom by confessing, or go to jail
for one year due to his silence.
Suspect II
Confess

Do not confess

Confess

5, 5

0, 10

Do not
Confess

10, 0

1, 1

Suspect I

Figure 13.

Matrix 7: Prisoner's Dilemma Model.

In either case, Suspect I has a better outcome if he confesses because
confessing is a dominant strategy in this game. If so, what is the following problem?
Two naive prisoners, too ignorant to follow our inference, may both remain
silent and go to jail for only one year. By contrast, two sophisticated prisoners,
familiar with game theory, will confess and are sentenced to five years in prison. In
other words, the paradox lies in that the suspects who adopt a dominant strategy to
benefit themselves in turn suffer more than those who give up a dominant strategy
and try to cooperate with each other. Then the prisoner's dilemma occurs. Snyder
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extracted two relevant characteristics from the framework of Prisoner's Dilemma.
That is, (1) the logic of the players' situation naturally forces them into conflict and
mutual losses though they could enjoy mutual benefits by cooperation; (2) at the
psychological level two kinds of incentives, the "offensive" and the "defensive"
incentive would determine the players' decision on choosing strategies, either to
maximize self-interests or minimize losses. 69 In addition, he argues that the core of
the Prisoner's Dilemma lies in the inability to confirm the other player's intentions. In
other words, the primary point in Prisoner's Dilemma is to determine which incentive,
the offensive or the defensive, is operating most strongly in the opponent's thinking.70
In short, due to lack of trust or suspicion, it is difficult for both players as a
rational actor striving for the maximum individual interests to cooperate though they
know that cooperation will increase their collective benefits.
Chicken Model
Chicken as a game-theoretical model is derived from the rather gruesome
sport that apparently originated among California teenagers in the 1950s. The story is
described as two teenager drivers approach each other at high speed on a narrow road.
Each has the choice of either swerving and avoiding a head-on collision, or
continuing on a collision course. There are four possible consequences while each
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player decides:
1. The player who does not swerve when the other does gets the highest payoff
of 4 for his courage and wins the respect from his peer groups.
2. The player who "chickens out" by swerving is disgraced and receives a
payoff of 2.
3. If both players lack the will to continue on the collision course to the final
moment, both suffer some loss of prestige, obtaining payoff of 3, but not as much as
if only one player had chosen safety instead of collision by swerving.
4. If both players refuse to cooperate, then they cause their mutual destruction,
which may be fine for martyrs but not for the players in this game, who receive the
lowest payoff of 1.
The structure of Chicken is displayed in Matrix 8 (Figure 14).
Player B
Swerve
Swerve

Do not swerve

3, 3

2,4

4,2

1, 1

Player A
Do not
Swerve
Figure 14.

Matrix 8: Chicken Model.

Overall, Chicken bears some resemblance to Prisoner's Dilemma, except that
the worst outcome for both players in Chicken occurs while both players "defect"
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from cooperating. This is the second worst outcome to both players in Prisoner's
Dilemma. The worst going to the player who defected when his opponent cooperated.
Snyder notes that a rational player in Chicken is apt to choose cooperation while
facing an opponent who is not expected to abandon his initial demand for cooperation.
In other words, a rational player can not "protect himself' by non-cooperation for
mutual non-cooperation is the worst possible outcome. 71 Rationality in Chicken is
equivocal, what is rational depends on a player's expectations about the other's
behavior not primarily on the game's payoff structure. 72 In Rapoport's words, in
contrast to Prisoner's Dilemma in which the rational outcome is identified as the
defecting one, the cooperative outcome in chicken is the natural outcome.73
Snyder has recognized a couple of essential characteristics of Chicken as
follows:
1. There is a bargaining dimension; that is, there is some incrementally
divisible good such that the more Player A has of it, the less Player B has of it.
2. There is a bargaining range or contract zone that includes both initial bids
plus the space between them. All points in this range are preferable to no agreement
for both players. DD, no agreement, sets the outer limits of the bargaining range. It is
also the worst outcome for both players.
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3. It is possible for both players to reduce their initial bids. One way to agree
is for one player to reduce his claim until it matches the initial bid of the other player
(CD or DC), i.e., to back down entirely.
4. Another way to reach agreement is for both players to reduce their bids until
they match (CC). In other words, cooperation (CC), which is better for both players
than defection (DD) or unilateral capitulation (DC or CD).
5. It is possible to offer the opponent positive inducements (heuristically, the
carrot) to yield. Such an inducement consists in increasing the opponent's capitulation
payoff.
6. Increasing the cost of no agreement is also possible, that is, to threaten
increased harm (heuristically, the stick). However, the stick hurts both players. 74
Contrasts Between Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken
Compared to the essential feature of Chicken, a contest in which each player is
trying to prevail over the other, the major theme of Prisoner's Dilemma, in Snyder's
words, is that of the frustration of the mutual desire to cooperation. In both models,
perceptions of the other player's intentions are significant. The players ways face a
problem of establishing the credibility of their stated intentions. For example, m
Prisoner's Dilemma, establishing credibility means instilling trust. Whereas m
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Chicken, it involves creating fear.

75

In other words, what a rational player worries

during a Prisoner's Dilemma game is the "dilemma" whether he should trust his
opponent before his decision to cooperate for the sake of increasing self-interests.
However, in a Chicken game, he will consider whether his opponent would play
tough, and when he should give in if the outcome would damage his safety (or vital
interests). In addition, the cooperative outcomes either in Prisoner's Dilemma or in
Chicken, is not equilibrium.
To achieve cooperation, both players must "resist the temptation" to shift
away from the cooperative outcome in pursuit of the largest interest. Each must trust
the other not to give in. The game differs in that in Prisoner's Dilemma, if one
player defects, the other gains by retaliating and defecting in turn. Whereas, in
Chicken, retaliation is more costly than capitulation. More important, in Prisoner's
Dilemma there is no competitive pressure on the natural outcomes as there is in
Chicken. On these bases, Rapoport argues that the natural outcome, i.e., DD, would
be more stable in Prisoner's Dilemma. The natural outcome in Prisoner's Dilemma is
regarded as Pareto-deficient76 ; by contrast, it is Pareto-optimal in Chicken. On this
basis, one might expect the natural outcome, CC, to be more stable in Chicken.
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A Pareto-deficient outcome is viewed as a determined result derived from the
combination of the players' defecting strategies, especially in a Prisoner's Dilemma
game. In most cases, according to Rapoport, a Pareto-deficient outcome seems
inevitable because defection is a relatively dominant strategy in contrast to
cooperation and the players are tending to maximize their minimum payoff.
76
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Suggested Solutions to Game-Theoretical Models
According to von Neumann, a solution means "a set of rules for each
participant which tell him how to behave in every situation which may conceivably
arise."77

Solutions to a Deadlock game is easily found if a dominant strategy might

result in a saddle point or an equilibrium for one player or both. That is, according to
the logic of rational choice, each player is expected to adopt a dominant strategy, if
any, or stick to a saddle point. Then, the game would be solved in a determined way.
However, to those games without a relatively dominant strategy or an equilibrium,
studying the styles and attitudes of the players' responses in decision-making
processes is interesting for us, i.e., in a game.
For example, how could we solve any non-zero-sum game in which the
players are not totally against each other in interests. For example, if there is common
interest between both and if both players cooperate they could increase their own
private expected outcomes? Imagine you are Suspect I in Prisoner's Dilemma, what
should you do? To be sure, there is no way out of Prisoner's Dilemma if they play the
game just once. Choosing is rational for both suspects "confess" because they are
afraid of being double-crossed. Then, (5, 5) will be assigned to both suspects as a
determined payoff. By contrast, if they can play the game often, i.e., both players do
not have any idea when the game will end, choosing cooperative strategy to increase
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payoffs might be possible for both players. According to his experimental results,
Rapoport points out that the players in two-by-two non-zero-sum iterated games like
Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken stick to the preceding response, especially CC and
DD. 78 That is, due to "locked in" the preceding experience of conflict management,
the players are learning to cooperate.
"Tit for Tat" Strategy

To the conflict situation we mention above, "tit for tat" may be applied as a
particle strategy in which we can explain why the cooperation is viewed as a rational
choice. Axelrod defines "tit for tat" as a strategy with which the players choose
cooperation first and then choose whatever strategy the opponent chooses. 79 We can
represent the "tit for tat" strategy in the following Figure 15.
Strategies available (Defection or Cooperation)
No. of Play

1

2

3

4

5

6

Player A

C

C

C

D

D

(C)

Player B

C

C

D

D

D

(CID)

Figure 15.

Tit for Tat Strategy.
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According to the assumption of "tit for tat," in the first round Player A will
adopt cooperation when he competes with Player B in an iterated game. To Player B,
he can respond with either cooperation or defection. If he also cooperates, as we
assume, then Player A will stick to the cooperation strategy.
This cooperative relations between both players will last until one side begins
to defect (it usually happens on Player B because Player A adopts a "tit for tat"
strategy.) Up to the third round, Player B obviously violates a binding agreement and
shifts his strategy from cooperation to defection, which indeed affects on Player A's
following reaction. Facing Player B's defection, Player A can not help turning to
defection in order to eliminate the likely loss due to double cross. Besides, there is a
"locked-in" phenomenon easily identified in the preceding figure, for example, the
interaction between both players in the first three rounds or from the third round to
the fifth round. The "locked-in" phenomenon, either continuous cooperation or
defection, naturally exists in a game when one or both players choose "tit for tat" as a
strategy. 80
It may happen that Player A ( or Player B) would change his mind to
cooperate again ( like in the sixth round) to increase unilateral payoffs guaranteed by
mutual cooperation. However, this transformation in strategies, especially under the
defection locked-in situation, is uncertain because the players have to take a risk of
being double-crossed and believe the other players sharing the similar spirit to do so.
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Matrix 9 (Figure 16) indicates the application of "tit for tat" to a Prisoner's
Dilemma game.
Suppose Suspect I wants to adopt "tit for tat" as a strategy. At the first step,
Player A chooses the low row (does not confess, i.e., cooperation) and waits for
Player B's response. There are two alternatives open to Player B, either the right
column (cooperation) or the left column (defection).

Suspect II
Confess

Do not confess

Tit for Tat

Confess

5, 5

o, �o

5, 5

Do not
Confess
Tit for Tat

10, 0

1, 1

1, 1

Suspect I

Figure 16.

5, 5

1, 1

1, 1

Matrix 9: The Application of "Tit for Tat" Strategy.

If Player B adopts defection, then Player A would choose defection in
response to Player B's decision (according the logic of "tit for tat"). If so, the payoff
pair for "tit for tat" is (5, 5) located at the rightist column. By contrast, if Player B
adopts cooperation, then Player A would stick to a cooperative strategy. Under such a
situation, the payoff pair for "tit for tat" is (1, 1) located at the central column.
Obviously, "tit for tat" could benefit both players in an iterated game because (1, 1) is
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much more preferred than (5, 5).
Mixed Strategies
Like "tit for tat", mixed strategies may be applied as an efficient method to
pursue a solution. Suppose a player uses some random device to decide which choice
he will make. Since there are two choices (assume a game under the framework of
two-by-two), the random device should yield one of two outcomes. By fixing the
probabilities of these outcomes, the player in effect in effect choose a mixed strategy.
In other words, a mixed strategy can be regarded as a statement about "how many
times on average a pure strategy is used."81
Consider Matrix 10 (Figure 17)82 . Assume that Player A may switch back and
forth without following a pattern, i.e., by choosing randomly. Then, Player B can not
possibly discern a pattern because there is none to be discerned. Suppose Player A
flips a true coin (as a random device) each time to determine his choice. Then,
whenever Player B picks, say, the left column, the payoff to Player A is equally likely
to be 5 or -4, i.e., both payoffs have a fixed probability 1/2. The expectation of the
payoff, or simply expected payoff (expectation is defined as a weighted average of
outcomes where the weights are probabilities
81

83
),

is found as 1/2 (5) + 1/2 (-4) = 1/2.

Ken Binmone, Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory. p. 65.
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Whenever Player Bpicks the right column, the payoff to Player A is equally
likely to be 3 or 0 (each payoff has probability 1/2), so in the case Player A's expected
payoff on average is : 1/2 (3) + 1/2 (0) = 3/2.
Player B

5

0

-4

3

Player A

Figure 17.

Matrix 10: The Application of Mixed Strategies (1).

In other words, if Player A chooses a mixed strategy, say, half the top row and
half the low row, then he can get the minimum expected payoff 1/2. To be sure,
Player A can do better in this game if he decides to pick the top row with probability
7/12. Then, when Player B uses the left column the expected payoff to Player A is:
(7/12) (5) + (5/12) (-4) = 5/4 and when Player Buses the right column, the expected
payoff is: (7/12) (0) + (5/12) (3) = 5/4. In other words, in this way Player A can
arrange to have an expected payoff of 5/4 no matter what Player B may do. Notice
that the maxinin mixed strategy means the maximin among all strategies. To learn the
maximin mixed strategy for Player A in Maxtrix 10, we examine the effects of
various mixed strategies that Player A might adopt. In addition, a few mixed
strategies shown in Matrix 11 (Figure 18), which includes the pure strategies of
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Matrix 10 as its first two rows. However, in the new, extensive matrix the last row
has the largest minimum, and therefore (7/12, 5/12) is the maximin among the mixed
strategies.
More important, no matter what other mixed strategies are considered, 5/4 is
the best that Player A can guarantee himself under the probability pair (7/12, 5/12).
Can we prove it? Suppose the probability of the top row is increased beyond 7/12, say
to 7/12 + "C" ("C" represents a very small positive amount), then Player B can use
the right column to make the payoff as follows: (7/12 + C) (0) + (5/12 - C) (3) = 5/4 3C [A], or Player B can choose the left column as the response, if so, the payoff will
be: (7/12 + C) (5) + (5/12 - C) (-4) = 5/4 + 9C [B]. Obviously, since the payoff [A] is
less than 5/4, it is irrational for Player A to change the original mixed strategy.
Minimum in row
5

0

0

-4

3

-4

(1/2, 1/2)

1/2

3/2

1/2

(1/3, 2/3)

-1

2

-1

(7/12, 5/12)

5/4

5/4

5/4

Probability Pairs

Figure 18.

Matrix 11: The Application of Mixed Strategies (2).
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Also, since the payoff [B] is more than 5/4, it is irrational for Player B to
respond with the left column. Put another way, suppose the probability of the top row
is decreased by a small amount "C" to make it 7/12 - C, then Player B can pick the
left column and the payoff will be: (7/12 - C) (5) + (5/12 + C) (-4) = 5/4 - 9C [C], or
Player B can choose the right column, if so, the payoff will be: (7/12 -C) (0) + (5/12 +
C) (3) = 5/4 + 3C [D]. To Player A, he can not get more payoff when he transforms
the probability pair. By contrast, to Player B, it is a wise move to pick the left column
when Player A's mixed strategy is informed.
In short, player A can be forced to settle for less than 5/4 if he deviates from
(7/12, 5/12).
Other Principles for Solution
In his article," Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy," Oye describes how
payoffs affect the prospects for cooperation and present strategies to improve the
prospects for cooperation by altering the structure of payoffs. He notes that the
recognition of mutual benefits is necessary to promote cooperation because the game
(any non-zero-sum game) would follow the following hypothesis: The more
substantial the gains from cooperation and the less substantial the gains from
unilateral defection, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. 84 Deutsch also points
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out a couple of relevant conditions for a successful cooperation. He states that the
cooperation strategy may succeed if it results from a given situation in which one of
players (or both players together) (a) initiates cooperation (e.g., adopt "tit for tat"); (b)
persists in making cooperative moves since they are reciprocated; and (c) retaliates
with fail whenever repeated or frequent defection is encountered, but ( d) renews from
time to time thereafter a sequence of two or three unilateral cooperative moves to give
the opponent a chance to shift to a sequence of mutual cooperation.85
During his study of Cyprus conflict under the framework of Prisoner's
Dilemma, Lumsden argues that it may work to solve Prisoner's Dilemma by either
decreasing the value of the defecting outcome (DD), to the extent that it becomes the
lowest payoff (i.e., converting Prisoner's Dilemma into Chicken), or increasing the
value of cooperation. 86 According to our preceding description concerning the
characteristics of Chicken, the rational players naturally adopt cooperation in Chicken
because a living chicken is better than a dead hero. To be sure, solving a Chicken
game and a Prisoner's Dilemma game is easier if we can raise the cost of conflicts
although the defecting payoff is already the worst among other outcomes. In short,
either in Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken, Jervis suggests that the possibility of
cooperation would be enhanced if (a) the payoffs of both players increase under
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cooperation; (b) the costs of mutual confrontation increase; (c) the gains from shifting
away from a cooperative strategy and double-crossing one's opponent decrease; (d)
the cost of being double-crossed decreases; and (e) the expectations of both players
that cooperation will be achieved increase. 87
Conclusion
In the very beginning of this chapter, we describe the concept of equilibrium,
or other similar ideas like Nash equilibrium, saddle points, and the minimax principle,
that allows us to highlight some general characteristics related to game models.
Besides, these ideas can contribute to our primitive understanding of solutions for
game-theoretical models. By game models, we have distinguished zero-sum games
from non zero-sum games. From the perspective of zero-sum games, we conclude that
the result is determined because the players by nature will choose their own dominant
strategy which guarantees the second best payoffs for the players. Deadlock can
adequately display how the players behave rationally in the game in which their
interests are in total conflict. In non zero-sum games, there exist mutual interests,
inciting the players to cooperate with one another for the sake of elevating self
interests. Two well-known models, Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken, identified as
stereotypes for non zero-sum games, are discussed. Not only do we point out the
significant features of each game model, but we also make a comparison between
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Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken.
According to Snyder, the "dilemma" of a rational actor in a Prisoner's
Dilemma game is whether he should trust his opponent before he decides to cooperate
for the sake of increasing personal payoffs. By contrast, if he engages in a Chicken
game, he will place priority in considering whether his opponent will play tough, and
when he should give in if the expected outcome would damage his safety or vital
interests. Through comparison, we draw a conclusion that cooperation as a Pareto
optimal outcome in Chicken is more stable than that in Prisoner's Dilemma.
As to solutions to game-theoretical models, there are two major formula
mentioned in this chapter: the "tit for tat" strategy and mixed strategies. Axelrod
defines ''tit for tat" as the strategy in which the players choose cooperation first and
then adopt whatever strategy the opponent responds to. He argues that the players can
agree if they adopt "tit for tat" strategy simultaneously. A mixed strategy is viewed as
a statement about "how many times on average a pure strategy is used." By a mixed
strategy, Binmore notes that the players can seek the maximal expected payoffs in the
game. Other suggested solutions like Jervis', stressing on the reorganization of the
payoff structure, may also shed a light to address the question: How to solve a game?

CHAPTER IV
APPLICATIONS OF GAME-THEORETICAL MODELS TO INTERNATIONAL
CONCLICTS
Introduction
Game theory is based on at least two fundamental asswnptions: (1) a rational
actor will behave in accordance with his preference ordering; and (2) a rational actor
will adopt defecting or cooperative strategies in pursuit of his maximwn interests.
Structuring a game is easier, either zero-swn or non-zero-swn, by identifying the
major conflicts among the players. Two-by-two game-theoretical models are useful in
dealing with an interest-conflict situation between the rational players, although the
game models are criticized as too simple to describe and fit the complications of
reality within the structure of the game. Another general criticism regarding two-by
two models is that the models ignore the role of a third party and the possibility for a
third option in a given game.
Should we expect to extend the application of the scope of game-theoretical
models further and apply them to explaining international conflicts among nations
when we acknowledge there are a couple of limitations or weaknesses embedded in
game models? First, we should take a close look at the following problems initiated
by critics of game theory. They argue that most international conflicts do not have a
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clearly defined two-by-two structure. That is, there may be more than two nations
involved in a specific international conflict. Each nation as a rational actor may have
more than two alternatives to cope with a given crisis. In practice, the preference
ordering of a nation is more complicated, and thus difficult to identify. The essential
problem facing most game-theorists is that of "selecting the appropriate criteria to
choose the better game (model) to explain a situation."88
Does it make any sense for game theorists to choose two-by-two models
instead of n X m models? Put this way, can we solve the preceding problems with
respect to the applications of game models to international stalemates? In theory, the
choice set, the rows and columns of a matrix, may consist of diverse levels of
cooperation/defection, i.e., there may be more than two options in a game. However,
for the sake of building concise models, game theorists tend to set the number of n
equal to 2 because they use cooperation/defection as categories for classifying likely
strategies for the players. In doing so, they can identify and analyze "the basic
structure of the crisis situation" in which the strategy interactions are dramatically
reduced and easily focused. Take, for example, the U.S. options in the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962. From "do nothing" to the naval blockade, bombing of the missile sites,
and the invasion of Cuba, reactions and interactions can be contained within a two-

88

Christian Schmidt and Pierre Allan," Introduction," Game Themy and International
Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence, Pierre Allan and
Christian Schmidt, eds.(Aldershot, Hants, England: Brookfield, Vt., USA: Edward
Elgar, 1994), p. 2.

74
poles continuous scale, i.e., they would be located somewhere between cooperation
and defection.
As for the number of players in an international conflict, according to the logic
of game models, the nations are identified as players because there are obviously
conflicting and/or mutual interests among them in a �iven situation. Using the Berlin
crisis (1958-60) as an example, the major players in this crisis are the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. because both nations disagreed with the settlement of West Berlin. Although
on the surface that they agreed the Germans should reunify Germany someday
somehow. How do game theorists (or strategy analysts) deal with the influence and
attitude exerted by German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal
Republic (West Germany)? In practice, due to sharing the similar interests, they
viewed East Germany as a game partner with the Soviet Unions. In contrast, West
Germany stands on the U.S. side during the crisis.
Other reasons for the infrequent applications of the N-person model to
conflict situations include:
1. Researchers have to recognize a major player as a leader eager to form a
coalition among players. Before that, researchers should address the following
question: What would be the criterion for selecting a leader among players?
2. Researchers are supposed to find a "decision point"--a point in time when
they set

binding agreement are awarded and distributed among its members

(players). Obviously, N-person theory is vague about the location of this point (or
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equilibrium).89
It will be a significant problem to choose a adequate model to describe and
explain a specific conflict situation. In this study, to solve the problem of selecting
models, using two principles, the players' subjective recognition and the objective
constraint of the conflict situation when we assign a game-theoretical model to a
given situation. For example, we may identify a conflict situation which fits the
Prisoner's Dilemma while we observe there exists a combination of interest and
conflict between the players, and that both players with similar strength and resource
can simultaneously discover and adopt a dominant strategy to play. Moreover, the
players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game are not afraid to defect with one another, i.e.,
they prefer to bear the cost of mutual defection rather than be double-crossed by the
others. By contrast, we will recognize the situation as Chicken if one of the players
shifts away from Prisoner's Dilemma, i.e., compared to other players, he plays
Chicken due to fear ( e.g., the concern for security), lack of sufficient resources (e.g.,
the loss of outside help), or other considerations.
McClelland identifies five approaches (or aspects) to deal within analyzing a
specific international conflict : (1) definition of crisis; (2) classification of types of
crisis; (3) the study of ends, goals, and objectives in crises; (4) decision-making under
conditions of crisis stress; and (5) crisis management.90 In according with the
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characteristics or functions of game-theoretical models, we can say that each model
completely meets the profile for the study of international conflicts.That is, through
the structure of the game, either game tree or matrix, a specific crisis can be
represented; the types of conflicts can be determined; the goals or motives of the
players can be displayed; the alternatives for the players can be assigned; and the
players' choices can be predicted.Put another way, game-theoretical models can
reflect the reality of a interest-conflict situation to the extent that we can easily realize
the basic structure of the crisis situation. Lumsden notes that Prisoner's Dilemma as a
model of dealing with international conflict displays a couple of significant features:
(a) neither player assumes war as the worse of all possible outcomes; (b) each player
assumes the other player's most desired outcome as his own worst outcomes; (c) each
player assumes peace much more positively than war; (d) neither player assumes
91
peace more positively than his own initial goal.

As for the relation between a model and reality, Meehan has identified the
following useful guidelines:
If a model is used as an aid to explanation, then the interaction of
elements in the system is prime; if the model is used for prediction, the
outcome of dynamic processed in model and empirical world must be
similar....Models are always partial and approximate, as are
analogies. It follows that there will be properties of observed reality not
Theory of International Crisis Behavior," International Studies Quarterly. vol.21
(March 1977), pp.39-40.
91
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duplicated in the model, at least potentially, and it is always possible
that models have properties that are not duplicated in the empirical
world. Furthermore, models and analogies may be useful in creating
some expectations with regard to reality but may be quite useless and
even misleading in other respects.92
Before introducing of the cases in this study, two points as to the structure of
the game should be noted. First, we view each international crisis as a continuous
event that could fit into a repeated game-theoretical model. Next, the payoffs we
assign to each player are aggregate. They are accumulated from the first round to the
final one. Representing payoffs with numeral units is not necessary always. It may be
enough to expose each player's preference ordering by means of a game matrix
because a rational player could/would adopt an adequate strategy according to the
pattern of his preference ordering.
Deadlock: The Southwest Pacific Conflict
The Background of the Conflict
In February 1943, General Geoge Churchill Kenney, Commander of the Allied
Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, was responsible for military decisions. In the
critical stages of the struggle for New Guinea, intelligence reports showed that the
Japanese were about to strengthen their army in New Guinea by moving a troop from

Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study (Homewood,
Illinois: Dorsey, 1967), pp. 31-32.
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the port of Rabaul at the eastern tip of New Britain to Laein and they had a choice of
two alternative routes. They could sail either north of New Britain, where the weather
was rainy and poor visibility was certain, or south of New Britain, where they
expected that the weather was fair. Regardless, the journey would take three days.
General Kenney had to decide as which route to concentrate the bulk of his
reconnaissance aircraft. On either route the American army could bomb the Japanese
ships. By contrast, the Japanese obviously wanted their ships to have the least
possible exposure to enemy bombers.93
The Likely Payoffs of the Game
The structure of the game is represented in Matrix 12 (Figure 19).
Japanese Strategies

North R0ute
Kenney's Strategies
South Route

Figure 19.

North Route

South Route

2

2

1

3

Matrix 12: The Southern Pacific Conflict.

The number assigned into the cells shows the expectation of bombing day.
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There exists no mutual interest. To Kenney, the higher the number the better; but the
Japanese wanted the opposite. To the Japanese commander, the payoffs (the right
column and the left column) were obviously the same-- sail the north or the south
route.
The Players' Preference Orderings and Strategies
Since being exposed to few days of American attack is better for the Japanese
army, we can display the preference ordering for the Japan as (1, 2, 3).
Compared to the north route strategy, the south route strategy was a relatively
dominant strategy because it may avoid the additional damage to the army due to the
caprice weather. In such inference, choosing the south route strategy is wise for the
Japanese commander. By contrast, the preference ordering for the U.S. was (3, 2, 1).
Kenney chose to take a risk though he could expect the Japanese decision according
to estimating and analyzing the structure of the game.
The Solution of the Game
The game ended with the fact that the Japanese chose the south route strategy
and suffered severe losses. However, Haywood argues that "although the Battle of the
Bismark Sea ended in a disastrous defeat for the Japanese, we cannot say the Japanese
commander erred in his decision."94 That is, as we mention above, his choice, either
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the north route strategy or the south route strategy, was good against either of
Kenney's strategies.
Prisoner's Dilemma: The Berlin Crisis (1958-1960)
The Background of the Conflict
In a Note to the Western Powers and the Federal German Government on
November 27, 1958, Khrushchev unilaterally abrogated the Potsdam agreements of
1945. Those agreements stipulated that Germany would be restored as a single nation
following democratic principles under the supervision of the Four Powers on
Occupation. Also, he required the withdrawal of all Western forces from Berlin and
the abolition of all ties existing between Berlin and the Federal Republic in six
months. If the Western Powers refused to negotiate a peace treaty, the Soviet Union
would unilaterally make a peace treaty with East Germany (the Soviet puppet regime)
and turn over control of the access routes to West Berlin to the East German
government.
The Likely Payoffs of the Game
According to Snyder's model, the structure of the game could be created as
Matrix 13 (Figure 20, under the framework of Prisoner's Dilemma).95

95

Snyder's model (Figure2-27. West Berlin, 1958), see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul
Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System
Structure in International Crises (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1977), p. 92.

81
United States
Firm

Concede

Self-assertion gainst Soviet
Union; stabilization of
status quo.

promise settlement of
inor disputes concern
ing West Berlin an
Concede
(Cooperate)

Soviet Union

Firm
(Defect)

Figure 20.

Compromise
peace settle in Germany
some modification of
status of West Berlin.
US humiliation; demoraliz
tion of West Berlin and
est Germany; loss of
hope of reunificPeace settlement
in _Germany;
stabilized status quo
with Western Powers out
of West Berlin.

Humiliation;
demoralization

Soviet Union peace treaty
3 with G.D.R.; probable

routes possible
Soviet Union
local or
peace treaty with
general
G.D.R. Limited fightin ,
cease-fire, negotiations.

Matrix 13: The Berlin Crisis (1958-1960).

The Players' Preference Orderings and Strategies
The intention of Khrushchev's action could be uncover by means of the
analysis of the contents of Soviet proposal for peace settlement in Germany on May
15, 1959 in which three major points were exposed:
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1. The basic Soviet contention that their occupation zone be regarded as an
equal of the Federal Republic with no mention made of free elections and with no
time limit on the negotiations to be conducted only by the two opposing German
camps. Since East Germany is a puppet of the Soviet regime, this made the Soviet
Government practically the sole negotiator with the Federal Republic, with the
Western Powers completely excluded.
2. The second point of the Soviet plan involved ending the occupation of
Berlin by the Western Powers altogether, under the formula of establishing Berlin as a
"free, demilitarized city." Since West Berlin was, after all, free to begin with, the key
word "demilitarization" obviously meant no more than the evacuation of the city by
the Western Powers, leaving it defenseless and completely surrounded by Soviet
controlled territory.
3. The third point called for the withdrawal of the NATO powers from all
"foreign territory" and the dismantling of all military bases.96
In other words, the best payoff for the Soviet Union would be to reach peace
settlement in Germany and isolate West Berlin from the Western Powers. An
additional benefit would be that the reputation of the West Community in the
German' mind and the NATO powers in the European continent would be
undermined. The second best result would be to comprise peace settlement under
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certain conditions (e.g., trade some modification of status of West Berlin for the
international identification of East Germany). By contrast, the second worst payoff
would be to unilaterally sign peace treaty with East Germany regime. The worst result
would be to invite humiliation and to lose political reputation in East Europe.
According to Snyder's analysis, from the Soviet Union position Khrushchev
hoped the United States to concede (DC), and to succumb under the Soviet's threat
and excuse of establishing a free city. By submitting the proposal and expressing
willing to negotiate on a peaceful settlement, the Soviet Union was eager to search for
a compromise acceptable to both sides (CC). The Soviet Union could achieve certain
interests from a cooperative consequence. They could · confirm their aggression
strategy in Europe, strive for international identification for East Germany, and clarify
the United States' standpoint on German problem. Under Prisoner's Dilemma, the
Soviet Union did not avoid the possibility that the game came to a deadlock (DD).
Khrushchev estimated that if so, "there would be some brief but intense tank and air
battles, a cease-fire, and then negotiation on the CC pattern". As to the worse
outcome (CD), the Soviet Union was forced to endure the West German "revenge
seekers" who used West Berlin to stir up trouble in the Socialist camp and weaken the
stability and security of East German regime.97
To the United States, the preference ordering would be consisted of four likely
outcomes: (1) the best payoff would be maintain the status of West Berlin and to
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resist Soviet's threats; (2) the second best result would be to concede to some
Soviet's requests for peaceful settlement ; (3) the second worst payoff would be to
confront the likelihood of East Germany's blockade and harassment to West Berlin;
and (4) the worst result would be to invite humiliation and to decline the influence of
Western Powers in East Europe. Since they aimed the Soviet action or proposal at
humiliating the West that, if allowed to succeed, would undermine the reputation of
the West Community, damage vital interests, and what is more important, perhaps
leads to the eventual collapse of NATO. In contrast to the consequence of conceding
(DC), the payoff of DD was much more acceptable and tolerable. That is, the United
States in practice stood firm though it would run a risk of war that might arise from
East German harassment or blockade of the access routes. Besides, the United States
assumed that the Soviet Union was playing Chicken and behaved as if it were a bluff,
which convinced it to play hard. Like the United States, the Soviet Union as a rational
actor, under the limitations of Prisoner's Dilemma framework, to maximize
individual interests or corroborate the minimum benefit would like to confirm its
attempt to humiliate the United States at the expense of partial intense conflict rather
than accept a sucker's payoff. It seems that DD would be the only one rational
solution to both sides.
The Solution of the Game
Due to both players' adoption of a dominant strategy and because of the
limited cost of local military conflict, the conflict situation (DD) lasted until the end
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of 1960. Not until 1961 did Khrushchev suggest friendliness to Kennedy
administration and end the second Berlin Crisis.
Chicken: Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
The Background of the Conflict
In late July 1962, the Soviet Union began shipping weapons and military
personnel to Cuba. The Soviet government explained that the arms sent to Cuba
would enable Fidel Castro to defend his regime against future American attacks. Not
until by October 15 had CIA photographic analysts studied the U-2 pictures and
announced that the Soviet Union was building launching sites for both 1,000-mile
medium-range missiles (MRBM) and 2,200-mile intermediate-range missiles (IRBM).
A simple choice by Khrushchev initiated the crisis to place missiles in Cuba.
The Likely Payoffs of the Game
The structure of the game can be represented as Matrix 14 (Figure 21, the
likely payoffs for both players are assigned within each cell)98 •
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United States
Cooperate

Defect

2
protection of resolve
Cooperate

Humiliation;
Undermined

Mutual removals of
missiles of other trades.

position in
nuclear

Cuba remains vulner
able.
Soviet Union

2
4
Humiliation; Loss of
position in nuclear
balance and balance

Defect

Various levels of possible
war, including possible
escalation to nuclear.

elf-assertion against
th� United States;
protection of Cuba.

Figure 21.

Matrix 14: Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).

The Players' Preference Orderings and Strategies
To the U.S. the removal of missiles at the lowest cost would be the optimal
payoff in this crisis. The second best result would be to get the missile removed at the
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expanse of other trades. The second worst payoff would be to invite humiliation and
allow the Soviet Union to upgrade nuclear power. The worst result would be to risk
initiating various levels of war, including nuclear war. To achieve the best outcome
and eschew a likely catastrophe , Kennedy had to decide among three possible
reactions: (1) accept the Soviet missiles in Cuba; (2) attempt to remove them by
military force; or (3) attempt to induce Khrushchev to remove them.99
In fact, we could view the last two choices with the same purpose, i.e., to
remove missiles from Cuba. Adopting the first choice was impossible for Kennedy
because "if Khrushchev could place missiles this close to the United States and get
away with it, the United States would look like a paper tiger." 100 In practice, Kennedy
went with the third choice. He decided to blockade with a threat to launch a military
attack. Kennedy and his advisers were very concerned about the possibility that an
American attack on Cuba might be followed by a Soviet attack on Berlin, or on
American missile sites in Turkey. In other words, the United States chose to play
tough and estimated the conflict would be treated as a Prisoner's Dilemma game, i.e.,
the Soviet Union may adopt a defecting strategy, then partial war or other disastrous
consequence was inevitable. Betts argues that the blockade in the Cuban missile crisis
was regarded as "threats that leave something to chance." That is, the action
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represented either a commitment to the United States or the risks that it entailed led to
pressure on the Soviet Union to capitulate.101 Also, Allison calls the blockade
decision "part choice and part result--a melange of misconception, miscommunication,
misinformation, bargaining, pulling, hauling, and sparring, as well as a mixture of
national security interests, objectives, and government calculation." 102
The Soviet Union's preference ordering could be specified as follows:
1. The best payoff would be to improve its position in the nuclear balance and
at the same time to protect Cuba from the American invasion in the future.
2. The second best result would be to compromise to remove the missiles in
trade of something (e.g., the removal of the United States missiles in Turkey).
3. The second worst payoff would be to invite humiliation and to leave Cuba
vulnerable.
4. The worst result would be to face the likely war with the United States,
including nuclear war.
To seek the best outcome or to attempt to avoid the grand cost of war, what
was Khrushchev's response to Kennedy's threat? Khrushchev's actual response was
to behave as if he planned to challenge the naval blockade, while simultaneously
accelerating construction of the missile sites. In other words, Khrushchev implied to
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play firmly. If so, it is well known that we would identify the crisis as a Prisoner's
Dilemma game. However, during the American blockade, through the secret
communication with the White house, suddenly Khrushchev agreed to remove the
missiles out of Cuba while the American government promised that the American
army would not attack Cuba.
To most Soviet affairs specialists, their attention may be placed on the
puzzling questions raised by Khrushchev's behavior: Why did Khrushchev deploy
strategic weapons in Cuba? What led him to believe he could succeed? Or Why did
he withdraw the weapons so precipitately?
According to his analysis, Allison notes that the Soviet Union placed missiles
in Cuba not only as a bargaining counter for the withdrawal of the United States
missiles in Turkey, nor to attract a US move against Cuba to cover a Soviet move
against Berlin, nor to deter an US attack against Cuba to display moves against an
indecisive United States, but rather to cause quickly and at low cost a rectification of
the adverse nuclear missile balance by converting Cuba into an "unsinkable carrier"
and doubling the Soviet capability for a first strike against the United States. 103 Brams
recognized the Cuban missile crisis as a Chicken game because "neither side
(especially the Soviet Union) was eager to take any irreversible steps, such as the
teenage driver in a game of Chicken might do by defiantly ripping off his steering
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wheel in full view of his adversary, thus force losing his alternative of swerving." 104
Obviously Khrushchev played Chicken during the crisis though at the very beginning
of the crisis he pretended to play Prisoner's Dilemma by means of implying
retaliation if the United States attacked Cuba.
To be sure, the blockade alone did not lead to the withdrawal of Soviet
missiles from Cuba. Giving a United States assurance against an invasion of Cuba
combined with a threat of "overwhelming retaliatory action" unless Kennedy received
immediate notice that the missiles would be withdrawn. 105
The Solution of the Game
Since the crisis was identified as a Chicken game, the worst outcome of
defection (DD) could be avoided because the Soviet Union tended to play Chicken
instead of Prisoner's Dilemma. Then, the payoff for the action of the United States
could be either mutual removal of missiles by trading Turkey missile sites for Cuba
missiles or protection of reputation or position in unclear balance. Since the United
States played firmly with Prisoner's Dilemma, the natural outcome for the United
States would be not only the removal of Cuba missiles, but also confirmed its ground
in protecting vital national interests at the cost of "nerves" and a promise not to
invade Cuba.
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Conclusion
In introduction to this chapter, two general criticisms regarding the
applications of game-theoretical models to explaining and predicting international
conflicts among nations were presented. These criticisms included (1) most
international conflicts do not have a clearly defined two-by-two structure; (2) the
preference ordering of a nation in the game is rather more complicated to identify.
From both theoretical and practical perspectives, we analyze and consider factors that
help explain why game theorists tend to choose two-by-two models instead of n X m
models and how they can apply the models.
In contrast to McClelland's standards, game models are well equipped with
the capacities to define crises by classifying them into types, to analyze the players'
goals and decision-making processes in crises, and to provide likely solutions
concerning crisis management. Besides, Lumsden highlights a variety of features
with respect to applying game models like Prisoner's Dilemma to international
conflicts. These features are: (a) neither player assumes war as the worst of all
possible outcomes; (b) each player assumes the other player's most desired outcome
as its own worst outcomes; (c) each player assumes peace much more positively than
war; (d) neither player assumes peace more positively than his own initial goals.
In this chapter, we have reviewed three previous case studies: the Southwest
Pacific Conflict of 1943, the Berlin Crisis of 1958-60, and Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962 in terms of game-theoretical analyses. In the aftermath of the descriptions and
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analyses, we have used our theoretical perspective to conclude that a certain type of
game model is suitable for a specific conflict, e.g., we better explain the decision
makers' goals and reactions during Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

in terms of

Chicken than Prisoner's Dilemma.
With further understanding regarding the features of a certain type of game
model, we can formulate a multi-game model in which a couple of models are used
and mixed in accordance with a given situation. Game models are allowed to shift
from one to another when the structure of the game is altered as time goes on. In the
following chapter, we will use this approach to decode the complicated dynamics of
mainland China-Taiwan relations over the past years.

CHAPTERV
A CASE STUDY: MAINLAND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS (1949-1995)
Introduction
The major purpose of this case study is to evaluate the capability of game
theoretical models in describing and explaining international conflicts. I believe that
if there is any finding (e.g., the patterns of strategy adoption of mainland China and
Taiwan over time) on the mainland China-Taiwan conflict produced as a result of
game-theoretical analysis, it may contribute to our better understanding of
international politics in the Asia-Pacific rim, although to a certain extent political
reality

1s

more

"amenable

to

case-by-case

analysis

than

broad-stroke

characterizations." 106
In applying game-theoretical models, we note some basis assumptions of
game theory during our analysis of mainland China-Taiwan relations. First, we
assume that the government of each nation behaves like a rational actor in an iterated
game and each nation may cooperate or defect in pursuit of its own optimal result. In
other words, both countries are expected to adopt certain actions under specific
situations according to their own preference orderings.
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During this case study, the attitudes and interventions exerted by a potential
third party like the United States and the Soviet Union would be taken into account to
some extent. These interventions may or may not influence players' strategies in a
given phase. There may be a couple of break points for separating mainland China
Taiwan relations. In this case study, the relations between mainland China and
Taiwan for the past four decades are divided into three individual phases: (1) the
military confrontation phase (1949-1978); (2) the peaceful competition phase (197986); and (3) the premature cooperation phase (1987-1995).
In 1949, due to the military defeat in the mainland,

Chiang Kai-shek's army

retreated to Taiwan. After establishing the People's Republic of China in October
1949, the Chinese Communists were eager to "liberate" Taiwan with military muscle
because the ROC's World War II ally, the United States, adopted a so-called "hands
off' policy to Taiwan. It was expected that Taiwan would be invaded and captured by
the PRC's army in the early 1950s. Not until the outbreak of the Korean War in June
1950 did the United States change its position on Taiwan from abandonment of the
ROC to the defense of Taiwan. Moreover, the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954 not only confirmed the American commitment to Taiwan's security but also
gave Taiwan a chance to compete with mainland China for the sovereignty of China.
In retrospect, the PRC has launched its army to invade Taiwan and attempted to
resolve the Taiwan issue on three individual occasions: (1) when Chiang Kai-shek's
army retreated to the island in 1949; (2) when military conflict broke out over the
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offshore islands in 1954; and (3) when military conflict broke out over the offshore
islands again in 1958. Due to the interventions and mediations of the United States
and because of the pouring of the U.S. military aid to upgrade the KMT anny's
equipment, training, and personnel, the PRC's attempt was blocked . Such military
confrontation (e.g., after the Second Straits Conflict of 1958 the PRC continuously
shelled Quemoy and Matsu on odd days only) and political propaganda (e.g., a war of
words), lasted up to 1979.
In 1979, the major reasons for the transformation of mainland China's
Taiwan policy included: (a) the diplomatic victory; and (b) the need for implementing
Deng's economic reforms. Obviously, the establishment of the official relations
between the PRC and the U.S. on January 1, 1979 made Peking feel more confident
of its ability to resolve the "Taiwan issue" on its own terms. It seemed as if the PRC
sent a clear message to the Republic of China that "now that we have won the battle
for international legitimization we do not need to try to prove it to you anymore." 107
Besides, the successful settlement of Hong Kong with the British government in 1984
also encouraged mainland China to adopt peaceful means and create a friendly
environment for reunification with Taiwan. 108 After his return to power in 1978, Deng
Xiaoping was eager to launch a series of economic reforms in company with the Four
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Modernizations
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•

To implement Deng's reforms, the PRC needed a peaceful

international environment in which it could procure financial supports and human
resources from foreign countries. 110 Thus, in January 1979 the PRC started to adopt a
cooperative Taiwan policy calling for mutual contacts and exchanges. In contrast to
mainland China's change in attitude and goal, the _change of Taiwan's mainland
China policy of 1987 was based on the following considerations:
1. It was a response to mainland China's less hostile and more "cooperative"
approach to Taiwan.
2. In order to reflect humanitarian considerations, i.e., allow Taiwan residents
to visit their relatives on mainland, Taiwan adjusted its mainland China policy, as
some ROC officials have insisted.
3. Taiwan's policy adjustment indicated that Taiwan was eager to reinforce
cultural bonds and other links with mainland China, e.g., its tacit approval of non
governmental cultural, athletic, and academic exchanges with the mainland and its
lifting of the ban on nonpolitical mainland publications.
4. Taiwan has been partly forced by economic pressures (due to the gradual
decline of competition capacity in the international market) to adjust its policy toward

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC began its Four Modernizations
(in agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) in 1979.
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mainland China.111
As for the assignment or identification of a specific game-theoretical model to
a given phase, I adopt the hypothesis:

the choice of an adequate model for a certain

conflict situation is based on two principles-- the subjective recognition of the players
and the objective constraint of the conflict situation. That is, we assume that the
structure of the game (or model) will be modified as the players change their initial
goals and their corresponding strategy under the influence of outside conditions.
According to the preceding principles, we will examine the military
confrontation phase by means of a Deadlock model, use the framework of Prisoner's
Dilemma to analyze the peaceful competition phase, and scrutinize the premature
cooperation phase under the structure of Chicken. Bau has developed three models to
explain the interactions between mainland China-Taiwan at the similar time period as
we have set: A Deadlock Game (1949-78), An Emerging Prisoner's Dilemma Game
(1979-86), and A Mature Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1987-88). Basically, we will
adopt his choice of the first two models for the relevant period. However, due to more
information available and data collected, also because of the goal of evaluating our
hypotheses as well as models, we will take advantage of Chicken as the major model
to deal with the third phase instead of the model he suggests.
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The Military Confrontation Phase (1949-1978)
The Background of the Conflict
Two political entities across the Taiwan Strait, both claiming to represent the
legitimate regime of China, have confronted each other since 1949. One is the
People's Republic of China (PRC), the other is the Republic of China on Taiwan. The
former won the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and has effectively controlled the
mainland for the past four decades. The latter was compelled to retreat to Taiwan
after it lost the battle to the Communists. The major conflict between both sides lay in
struggling for sovereignty to represent "one China."112
As soon as Chiang's army retreated to Taiwan, the PRC began its military
pressure on some offshore islands. The Chinese Communists attempted to give
Chiang's regime a final shot in the early 1950s when they were informed of the
American position toward Taiwan. In a news conference held on January 5, 1950,
President Harry S. Truman, despite the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
which suggested helping the ROC government defend Taiwan113, announced in a

Although both sides agree that there is only one China, both mainland China and
Taiwan have their own explanations of the concept of "one China." To mainland
China, "one China" simply means "the People's Republic of China (PRC)," with
Taiwan as a province or a special administrative region after reunification. By
contrast, to Taiwan, "one China" indicates the "Republic of China (ROC)," founded
in 1911, with sovereignty over all of China. However, nowadays the ROC only has
jurisdiction over Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, and Matsu. Taiwan is a part of China, and
the Chinese mainland is a part of China as well.
112
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public statement the resolution of the American government to halt its constant
interventions in the Chinese Civil War:
The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa (Taiwan) or on
any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain
special rights or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time.
Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere
in the present situation. The United States will not pursue a course
which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly,
the United States government will not provide military aid or
suggestions to Nationalist forces (Chiang's regime) on Formosa. 114
To be sure, the following "hands-off' policy towards Taiwan was based on
this statement. Losing its faithful ally since World War II, the ROC confronted real
problems in defending Taiwan. The American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
the State Department intelligence section estimated that Chiang could not "effect
political and military adjustments sufficiently realistic to make possible a successful
defense of Taiwan."115 Also, Chen Cheng, one of Chiang's major subordinates,
frankly confessed that Taiwan's defense was "barely adequate", and there may be "no
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prospect for counterattack on mainland in foreseeable future."116 In practice, the
enemy which Chiang's army faced was the 3.7 million strong People's Liberation
Army (PLA) which, up to mid-1950, had the capability to send 200,000 troops by sea
to invade Taiwan.117
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, forced the Truman
administration to reevaluate its policy towards Taiwan. In consideration of Taiwan's
strategic importance and at the same time to contain the likely expansionism of
Communists into Southeast Asia, i.e., the United States would like to keep relations
with a well-known Chiang regime rather than a uncertain hostile Communist regime,
the Truman administration dramatically reversed its position toward Taiwan. On June
27 1950 President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait.
That is, the United States formally reinstated intervention in the Chinese Civil War
with military muscle after a decade (1940-1949) of military and economic aid to the
KMT.118 Not until the PRC 's involvement in the Korean War in October 1950 did
American commitment to Taiwan's security become a firm policy.
After Dwight Eisenhower entered the White House, he was supposed to have
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"unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland in February 1953. Chiang was allowed
to launch any level military actions against the mainland. However, the United States
set an unwritten condition, i.e., Chiang's regime was to consult with the United
States prior to initiating large-scale military actions.119 During the First Straits Crisis
in late 1954 and early 1955, for the first time Chiang formally promised the United
States that his government would neither invade nor launch large-scale attacks on the
mainland without consulting with the United States.120 This unwritten understanding
between both countries was consolidated in the Mutual Defense Treaty. In the
negotiations for the Mutual Defense Treaty, Chiang begged the United States to keep
secret what he had promised, so that he would be free to preach in public the theme of
a military recovery of the mainland. Needless to say, to Chiang, abandoning the idea
of recovering the mainland meant losing his key purpose and damaging the regime
legitimacy.121 In 1958, Taiwan was under threat from the PRC in the Second Straits
Crisis. The Communist artillery was heavily shelling Quemoy, one of the offshore
islands under control of Chiang's regime. The ROC Air Force achieved professional
superiority over its counterpart. Its fighters shot down twenty-nine Chinese

119

"Record of Conversation when President Receive Dulles," 9 September 1954, f.9,
Folder B.212(a), Box 154, Koo Papers; "Notes on Talk with Rankin," 4 September
1953, FClOl11/62, FO371/105203, Public Record Office, London. Secondary source
cited from Steve Tsang (1993), p. 53.

12 °

Chiang's telegram to Washington Embassy, 29 January 1955, File B.13.l(e), Box
145, Koo Papers. Secondary source cited from Steve Tsang (1993), p. 53.
121

Ibid.

102
Communist MIG fighters, including MIG-l 7s.

122

However, in spite of the impressive

performance of his army, Chiang did not take the further step of bombing targets on
the mainland. Conversely, after the Second Straits Crisis, he agreed to issue a joint
communique with the United States, in which he noted:
The Government of the Republic of China considers the restoration of
freedom to its people on the mainland its sacred mission. It believes
that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts
of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully
achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three
people's principles (i.e., nationalism, democracy, and social well-being)
and not the use of force. 123
This statement formally ruled out the use of force for the recovery of the
mainland. Also, it reflected a gradual change in Chiang's attitudes to the sacred
mission. Until the latter part of the 1950s, Chiang began to give greater attention to
developing Taiwan into a model that would appeal to the Chinese on the mainland.
Also, developing Taiwan provided Chiang the opportunity to consolidate his rule and
make Taiwan much more difficult to invade. That is, the strategy to counter-attack the
mainland had in practice gradually been replaced by a strategy to recover the
mainland by political means.
According to mainland China's official announcements concerning Taiwan
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policy, during this phase mainland China's strategies could be separated into three
steps, i.e., "liberation by force," (1949-1954) "liberation by peaceful means but
reserve the possibility of using force," (1955-1969), and "returning to and identifying
with the motherland," (1970-1978).
After the Korean War (1950-1953 ), the United States and Taiwan signed the
U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Seventh Fleet was dispatched to the
Taiwan Strait in order to protect Taiwan from mainland China's attack. To protest the
signing of the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty and examine to what extent the
American commitment toward Taiwan was in the treaty, the PRC launched two
rounds of Straits Conflict: the First Straits Conflict of 1954 and the Second Strait
Conflict of 1958. Although these military actions failed to pressure Taiwan to
capitulate, they brought back a confirmed message that the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual
Defense Treaty could really retard the Communists' pursuit of reunifying China by
force in the foreseeable future. Under such difficult situations, mainland China tended
to adopt a relatively peaceful strategy, i.e., take advantage of political means instead
of military coercion.
In the early 1970s, the transformation of the American global strategy shed a
light on the resolution for the PRC's predicament in the international arena. In general,
the Nixon administration's pursuit for the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations aimed
at on the one hand pressuring Hanoi to agree with a settlement of the Vietnam War by
means of persuading the PRC to reduce support for North Vietnam; on the other hand,
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impeding the Soviet expansionism , as Nixon noted that "the greatest incentive for
Soviet cooperation in Vietnam, was our new relationship with the Chinese." 124
To be sure, the achievement of diplomatic results, e.g., the replacement of
Taiwan's seat in the Union Nation, and sign of a joint communique, Shanghai
Communique, with the United States on February 28, 1972 125 ; more importantly,
establishing official relations with the United States in 1979, mainland China felt
more confident in pursuing a peaceful Taiwan policy in the coming 1980s. The
establishment of diplomatic relations with · the United States was as if the PRC
claimed to the ROC that "we have won the battle for international legitimization we
do not need to prove it to you anymore." At the same time, by it the PRC sent a
message to the United States: the Chinese Communist Party was willing to solve its
problems with the KMT in peaceful means if the U.S. could establish friendly and
normal relations with the PRC and formulate a more hands-off policy with regard to
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the Taiwan issue. 126 Although the PRC implies to solve Taiwan issue peacefully, it
maintains the possibility of using force against Taiwan under certain conditions such
as: (a) Taiwan's pursuit of independence from the mainland; (b) the interference of
foreign powers; (c) the internal disturbance of Taiwan.
The Likely Payoffs of the Game
We borrow Bau's model displayed in Matrix 15 (Figure 22) to describe and
discuss the configuration of payoffs for the players in the phase of military
confrontation. According to the logic of a Deadlock game, Matrix 15 indicates that it
seems inevitable and rational for both sides to choose defection, i.e., confrontation
instead of cooperation with each other because the defecting strategy can help them
achieve the initial goals and there exists no mutual interest between both sides
because the payoffs for defection overweighed that for cooperation. For example, the
payoffs for Taiwan would be either Taiwan's counterattack over the mainland or the
retention of the status quo if Taiwan took a defective position. Under a deadlock
situation in which defection promises to escalate the minimal expected payoff, i.e.,
the military confrontation, Taiwan as well as mainland China would throw all their
weight into defection because each country has nothing to lose.
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Mainland China
Cooperate

Defect

3
Recognition of status quo
Taiwan may recover
the mainland.

1

Cooperate

Taiwan is taken
over by Beijing.
Recognition of
status quo; Taiwan
may lose to Beijing.

Taiwan

3
2
aintenance of confront
ation; Taiwan will be
iberated eventually
Defect

Taiwan recovers
the mainland.

1
Figure 22.

confrontation;
Mainland will be
recovered eventually
1

Matrix 15: The Military Confrontation Phase.

As for Bau's model, there are a couple of comments worth making. First of all,
by late 1948, or more exactly no later than 1952-53 after the Communist's Land
Reform Movement in association with the previous social revolution and
transformation initiated by the Chinese Communist in the early 1940s, the KMT's
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social-political basis of power was greatly undermined. 127 Thus, there would be no
option for Taiwan to retake the mainland. In addition, after Taiwan renounced the
use of force to recover the mainland in 1958, the chance for the reunification of China
under the guidance of Taiwan was almost zero. If the preceding argument is true, then
in game theoretical terms, the upper left cell of Bau's model would be empty. Of
course, there may be another interpretation. In addition to Bau's analysis, Gu argues
there were two peak activity periods in which the KMT was eager to recover the
mainland: one was from 1950-1953; the other was from 1962-1964. For example, on
July 17, 1953, with air cover and naval support, Chiang sent around 10,000 troops in
landing vessels and amphibious tanks to take Bongshan Island in Southern Fujian
Province of the PRC, although this attenipt failed and ended up with 3,379 casualties
after two days of battle. 128 In the early 1960s, the ROC's Intelligence Bureau of the
Defense Ministry formulated and implemented the so-called Sea Prowess Plan. There
were 1,800 crack military intelligence agents involved in this plan, trained and
dispatched to penetrate the society of the PRC to collect intelligence and to
destabilize the PRC government. This plan was the largest that was carried out by
Taiwan without U.S. approval. To a certain extent the plan had caused the PRC's
serious concern, because the PLA along the coast provinces was on full military alert
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all year round. Not until the PRC had successful talks with the U.S. at Warsaw
regarding Taiwan's activities was the Sea Prowess II Plan, scheduled to be
implemented in 1965 canceled under the U.S. pressure. 129 Judged from the
perspective of the KMT's military activities, Bau's assignment for this cell can
remain. If not, what kind of payoff would be assigned to replace the old one? Or, do
we just leave this cell empty? Then, in theory, what would happen with such a
settlement? Let's answer the latter question first. It would be highly suspicious for the
players to structure their preference orderings, let alone to choose a strategy, if the
upper left cell is empty. That is, there would not be a game. Otherwise, we are forced
to create a new scenario to occupy the empty cell. In retrospect, the proposal,
"coexistence" or "mutual recognition" in the international community, suggested by
the U.S. in the 1960s may be the one when mainland China and Taiwan competed
with each other for representing the China. However, at that time, this solution was
not preferred by the political leaders of both sides because the leaders influenced by
the Chinese culture or embedded with personal ambition tended to believe that to
allow the opponent to exist obviously implies a confession of one's failure. Then,
they would lose face and have no excuse to persuade their compatriots if they made
any concession to the opponent's favor. In terms of both the logic of a Deadlock game
and the leaders' subjective preference, the players apparently would like to adopt
defection rather than cooperation in this period.
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Another worth-while point is that, due to the American commitment to
Taiwan's security in the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty, it would have been
almost impossible for the PRC to take over Taiwan by military muscle. In addition,
there is only one thing for sure in Bau's model, i.e., both countries gradually tend to
recognize a separated China under two opposing political entities.
The Players' Preference Orderings and Strategies
As for the preference ordering of mainland China, mainland China's best
expected outcome at this time would have been to defeat Taiwan; the second best
outcome would be to recognize the status quo, i.e., mutual confrontation, and wait for
a chance to lead to the reunification of China.; the worst outcome would be to totally
capitulate to Taiwan; and the second worst outcome would be mutual cooperation in
which each side perceives itself as the possible loser. Needless to say, mainland China
chose defection as a dominant strategy in accordance with its preference ordering.
This defecting strategy consisted of military coercion and political critique. During
the 1950s, the PRC launched two military actions against Taiwan. The First and the
Second Straits Crisis initiated by the PRC were solved by Chiang's government with
American military aid. Since facing the failure of military attack, the PRC has
transformed its strategy from military means to political means. That is, it began to
broadcast the idea of "one China" in the international community and sell Zhou
Enlai's formula, "the peaceful liberation of Taiwan," to the Taiwan regime. However,
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at the same time, the PRC was eager to seek the replacement of the ROC's seat in any
international organization, especially in the United Nations. After it obtained the
ROC's seat in the UN, the PRC went further to isolate Taiwan in the international
occasions. Such a series of actions indicated that the PRC still adhered to a defecting
strategy, although it expected to solve the "Taiwan issues" peacefully, i.e., by
political means instead of military threat. Besides, Zhou' proposal to some extent
exposed the likely transformation of the PRC's attitude and strategy on Taiwan policy.
Not until did the PRC establish the official relations with the United States in January
1979, it formally began to pursue a cooperative strategy toward Taiwan.
To Taiwan, although the recovery of the mainland by force was slim or zero in
reality, Chiang's regime still believed that this cardinal mission could be fulfilled if
Taiwan followed the direction of Dr. Sun Yet-sen's three people's principles. In other
words, up to the 1960s, Taiwan resorted to political means to struggle for the
sovereignty of China ,though the Kuomintang continuously preached to mainland
veterans and Taiwan residents that it would fight back someday somehow. Due to the
failure of Great Leap Forward (1962-64), up to latter 1960s, the PRC sunk into the
chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and at the same time the Sino-Soviet rift widened
beyond repair. It is said that Chiang's regime tried to seek rapprochement with the
Soviet Union in order to further isolate mainland China. For example, in 1967, Prime
Minister Yen Chia-kan, reversed the government's usual slogan that "those who are
not our friends are our enemies," saying instead that "those who are not our enemies
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are our friends." The Soviet Union showed signs of interest in the likely development
of Taiwan-Soviet relations. Soviet publications began carrying occasional references
to Taiwan as a "country," and a Soviet representative at the UN implied that the
Soviet Union might support the accession of the PRC to the UN under the condition
that the ROC kept its seat. 130 It is reported that Mao Zedong worried about the likely
cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and the Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet
split. In 1965, Mao dispatched someone to Taiwan to feel out Chiang on this. Later,
Mao got a message from Chiang in which he noted that he would "never be on the
side of the Soviets."131
Like the PRC, Taiwan made a rational choice to play defection under such a
military confrontation situation and tried to seek outside help to increase political
resources for the future negotiation with the PRC. In this phase, Taiwan's strategy
was very simple. On the one hand, Taiwan cooperated with the United States for the
maintenance of the stable status of Taiwan. On the other hand, it insisted on the claim
of sovereignty over the mainland and firmly reacted to any threats, either military or
political, from the PRC.
Information relative to the interaction between mainland China and Taiwan
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during this phase was represented in Tables 1 and 2. According to Tables 1 and 2, we
can draw a few conclusions related to the PRC's Taiwan policy in this phase:
1. Liberating Taiwan by force is the constant position of the PRC, though
according to Zhou's speech of 1955 the PRC may resort to peaceful means to unify
with Taiwan. The PRC continuously declared that Taiwan is part of China and the
PRC has the sovereignty to decide when and how to seek reunification with Taiwan.
The PRC treated the Taiwan issue as Chinese internal affairs which left no room for
foreign powers to intervene.
Table 1
Mainland China's Defection in the First Phase
Year

Mainland China's Defecting Actions/ Announcements

October 24, 1949 The PRC dispatched two divisions to invade Quemoy.
Without any resupplies coming from the mainland, the PLA lost
the battle when confronted with 40,000 KMT troops.
January 7, 1950

People's Daily indicated that Taiwan would be "liberated" by force
this year.

January 1950

Beijing's Premier Zhou Enlai cabled the UN secretary general,
Trygve Lie, demanding that mainland China should replace Taiwan
in its seat in the UN.

January 1955

The PLA launched an assault on the island of Dachen.

August 23, 1958 The PLA began shelling of Quemoy.
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Table I-Continued
Mainland China's Defecting Actions/ Announcements

Year

After 1971

Beijing tried to force Taiwan out of international organizations, and
undermined its international status.

By the end of 1978 People' Daily used to label Taiwan leaders as a "ruling clique."

Sources: Compiled by the author according to the data represented in Appendix:
Peking-Taipei Interaction (1949-78), see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Peking
Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis, 194988," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 90; Weiqun Gu,
Conflict of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea (Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), pp. 22-37.
Table 2
Taiwan's Defection in the First Phase
Year

Taiwan's Defecting Actions and Announcements

January 1, 1950 Central Daily News indicated that President Chiang Kai-shek
planned to counterattack and recover mainland in 1950.
Early 1950s

1949-54

General Li Mi led KMT troops, which had escaped to Burma after
1949, to invade Yunnan Province.
Taiwan launched a couple of military harassment and attacks
around the areas of
Northwest China.

East, Central South, Southwest, and
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Table 2-Continued
Taiwan's Defecting Actions and Announcements

Year
July 17, 1953

Taiwan sent around 10,000 troops to try to take Dongshan Island in
Southern Fujian Province.

1957-58

Taiwan engaged in numerous guerrilla activities in Tibet.

Early 1962

Chiang Kai-shek attempted to send army to mainland to take
advantage of the timing of mainland China's economic crisis.
The Intelligence Bureau of the Defense Ministry formulated and

1962-64

implemented the Sea Prowess Plan.
Up to 1969

Taiwan launches occasional short-range missions against mainland;
dispatches high-altitude planes to gather intelligence, and
maintains regular air and sea patrols in the Taiwan Strait.

1949-78

Central Daily News referred to mainland China's leaders as
"Communist bandits."

Sources: Compiled by the author according to the data represented in Appendix:
Beijing-Taipei Interaction (1949-78), see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Beijing
Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis, 194988," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 90; Weiqun Gu,
Conflict of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea (Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), pp. 37-49.
2. The proposal of peaceful negotiation is based on the significant formula, i.e.,
after reunification the PRC would be the central government; Taiwan would be a
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local government in a specific administrative region.
3. The PRC absolutely objects to any intention to create "two Chinas," "one
China, one Taiwan," and to sell the idea of "Taiwan independence," and "Taiwan's
status is undetermined". In short, mainland China's ultimate intention was to take
over Taiwan; by contrast, Taiwan was eager to resist the likely threats from the PRC.
The Solution of the Game
Since the interactions between both countries were fitted into the framework
of a Deadlock game, the final payoffs for the players were determined, i.e., the status
of military confrontation inevitably existed across the Taiwan Straits. In 1979,

the

PRC began to tend to play more cooperative strategies than defecting ones. Launching
economic reforms and the Four Modernizations, the PRC gradually recognized that
there exist mutual interests (e.g., the mainland needs money, technology, and human
resources while Taiwan lacks cheap labers and a broad market for its products)
between both sides. Besides, the PRC observed that "T iwanese ideology 132" and the
idea of Taiwan independence have gradually preva1 ed among people when
Taiwan's stable economic development and the undertaking

132

litical reform are in

The concept of Taiwanese ideology was identified as a general "feelings of anger

and frustration against the KMT, and sorrow for the repressed lives they were
suffering." See, Wing-chung Pan, How the Opposition Evolved: A Case Study of
Taiwan's Democratization (Master's Thesis, Western Michigan University), p. 40.
Relevant discussion, see Guo-chang Huang, Chinese Ideology and Taiwanese
Ideology (Taipei, Taiwan: Wu-nan Press, 1992).
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good shape. The PRC reckoned that it is unbeneficial to maintain the status of
military confrontation with Taiwan because continuous military coercion might push
Taiwan to choose the way of independence instead of reunification with the PRC in
the long run. In other words, the mutual interests obviously would overweigh the
benefit derived from defection with Taiwan. This consideration directly resulted in
the transformation of Taiwan policy in 1980s.
To Taiwan, it realized that eliminating military conflict with the PRC could
free resources necessary to the modernization of Taiwan and the economic growth. In
addition, with the Kuomintang's Taiwanization 133 in the 1970s and the upheaval of
opposition forces (or the consolidation of Taiwanese ideology), the hostility to the
Chinese Communists gradually declined, although Chiang's regime still educated
people to counter the Communist regime on the mainland for the sake of legitimacy.
Because both players' subjective attitudes to the game have changed in association
with the transformation of the objective environment, the configuration of the game
shifted from Deadlock to Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Ching-kuo intended to recruit and promote more educated Taiwanese to the KMT's
decision making and legislative organizations. More discussion, see Masatake
Wakabayashi, Democratization in a Divided Countzy (Taipei, Taiwan: Xue-ying
Culture Press, 1994 ), p. 183. (A translated version from Japan edition "Higashiazia no
Kokka to Syakai 2 Taiwan," the University of Tokyo Press, 1992.)
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The Peaceful Competition Phase (1979-1986)
The Background of the Conflict
As we mention above, because of the victory of legitimacy competition over
Taiwan (e.g., the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979)
and the need for a peaceful international environment to implement Deng's reforms,
mainland China dramatically transformed its Taiwan policy. In January 1979
mainland China began to urge peaceful exchanges, negotiations, and reunification
with Taiwan though it would not renounce the use of force against Taiwan under any
condition. That is, mainland China searched for cooperation with Taiwan on the issue
of China reunification.
On January 1, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress (NPC) issued a message to Taiwan, in which hopes that "Taiwan returns to
the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the
great cause of national development." Besides, in order to call for negotiations to end
the military confrontation situation, the Committee announced the cessation of the
shelling of the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu, which had been carrying out
every other day since 1958.
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(NPC) Standing Committee, proposed a "Nine Point Opinion" as a guideline for the
unification of China, which included: (1) The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
the Kuomintang (KMT) should begin negotiation with equal status; (2) The two sides
on the Taiwan Strait should agree on mail, trade, transportation, visitation and tourist
exchanges, and such activities as academic, cultural, and athletic events; (3) Taiwan
would be given special regional status with political autonomy and its own military,
and the Beijing central government would not interfere in its internal affairs; (4)
Taiwan's current socioeconomic system would not need to be changed, nor its life
style. Private property, business, and inheritance would be allowed. Taiwan would
also be able to continues its economic and cultural relations with other nations; (5)
Taiwan leaders would be second to Beijing in occupying key national positions; (6)
The central government in Beijing would assist Taiwan if it encountered financial
hardship; (7) Taiwan residents who wanted to reside in the mainland would not be
discriminated against, and they would enjoy the freedom to move back and forth
across the Taiwan Strait; (8) Beijing would protect Taiwan investment interests on the
mainland; and (9) China's unification was the responsibility of all Chinese, therefore
Beijing welcomed suggestions from Taiwan or elsewhere on how to attain the goal of
reunification. 135 In addition, in June 1984, Deng Xiaoping began to advocate a new
formula for a peaceful reunification of China, i.e., "one country, two systems"
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principle. Mainland China emphasized that under the new formula Taiwan would
become a special administrative region, enjoying a high degree of autonomy, and
maintaining its own administrative and judicial systems as well as military forces, and
even its own budge after reunification with the mainland. The central government on
the mainland would send no personnel, either civil or _military, to Taiwan. 136 Actually,
this new formula was based on Deng's preceding five "opinions" on unification
proposed in June 1983.
What was Taiwan's response to these proposals? Partly due to being isolated
from international community, partly because of the lack of powerful patron like the
United States, for security's sake, Taiwan stuck to its confrontation strategy and
viewed mainland China's proposals as sugar-coated poison or mere lip service. Put
another way, up to this phase, Taiwan took care of its security more than struggling
for the legitimate representation of China with mainland China in the international
arena though it adopted a defecting strategy.
Since 1949, Taiwan has been under the shadow of being double crossed by
mainland China. Thus, when mainland China eliminated its hostile attitude to Taiwan,
and proposed a couple of apparently practical resolutions for the reunification of
China, Taiwan preferred defection to cooperation. Although the weaker actor is much
more vulnerable to its opponent's double cross, it does not mean that there is no room
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for Taiwan to adopt cooperative reaction.
The Likely Payoffs of the Game
According to Bau's model, the interaction between mainland China and
Taiwan for this phase could be displayed as Matrix 16 (Figure 23).
Mainland China
Cooperate

Defect
1
Taiwan is gradually influ
enced by mainland
and will possibly

Cooperate
Recognition of
status quo; Taiwan
may lose to Beijing.

Taiwan is
taken over by
Beijing

Taiwan
3
Tension between two
sides continues;
Prospects for re-

The mainland is gradual
ly influenced by
Defect
Taiwan
recovers
mainland
1
Figure 23.

confrontation;
Mainland will be
recovered eventually
2

Matrix 16: The Peaceful Competition Phase.
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In comparison to Deadlock, Prisoner's Dilemma provides an opportunity for
the players to cooperate. That is, both countries acknowledge that they can secure a
better outcome by means of cooperation. For example, mainland China may reunify
China with Taiwan at the relatively low cost if it calls for peaceful reunification by
enlarging the scope of mutual exchanges and contacts.
However, due to lack of mutual trust and fear of being double-crossed, the
cooperative strategy in nature is more unstable than the defecting one. If so, the
conflict in a Prisoner's Dilemma game is determined to ending up with a negative
payoff (defection pair) in contrast to the result of cooperation.
The Players' Preference Orderings and Strategies
Matrix 16 indicates that defection is the dominant strategy for both mainland
China and Taiwan, and the equilibrium is located at (2, 3). To achieve a better
outcome, mainland China adopted a cooperative strategy. That is, the mainland
leaders assumed that the use of force against Taiwan would not necessarily bring
about the reunification of China but may instead entail international intervention and
sanctions. Mainland China also understood that it would be impossible to pursue
cooperation with Taiwan if Taiwan remained a defecting strategy. The purpose of
most mainland China's proposals for peaceful unification aims at creating a friendly
environment in which Taiwan may shift from a Deadlock game to a Prisoner's
Dilemma game and understand that mutual interests could be raised through
cooperation with each other.

Since 1979 mainland China has tried hard to isolate
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Taiwan in the international community, this defection-oriented action was viewed as a
threat meant to increase the cost of Taiwan choosing a defecting strategy.
To Taiwan, for the sake of security, due to lack of symmetric resources as
mainland China, also because of the scare of being double crossed, Taiwan could
not help standing firmly with a defecting strategy while the conciliatory attitudes
mainland China expresses is just in the surface, i.e., Taiwan can not trust mainland
China's promises until it renounces the use of force against Taiwan. In short, till the
end of this phase, Taiwan has hesitated to adopt a cooperative strategy though it
knows well that cooperation would promise to increase both sides' outcomes in a
Prisoner's Dilemma game.
The data with respect to the interaction between mainland China and Taiwan
for this phase are displaying in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Table 3
Mainland China's Cooperation in the Second Phase
Year
Jan. 1979

Mainland China's Cooperation Actions/Announcements
Mainland China stopped shelling Quemoy and Matsu after establishment
of diplomatic relations with the United States and invites Taiwan to open
up "three links" (mail, trade, and tourism) and "four exchanges"
(academic, cultural, scientific, and athletic) with the mainland.
Deng Xiaoping told visiting US senators that Taiwan would be able to
retain its current political and economic system and even its own army
after reunification though it is required to surrender sovereignty to
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Table 3-Continued
Year

Mainland China's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

mainland China.
Sep. 1981 Chairman of National People's Congress {NPC) Standing Committee, Ye
Jianying proposed a "Nine Point Opinion" as a guideline for the
unification of China, which includes: (1) The Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) should begin negotiation with equal
status; (2) The two sides on the Taiwan Strait should agree on mail, trade,
transportation, visitation and tourist exchanges, and such activities as
academic, cultural, and athletic events; (3) Taiwan would be given special
region status with political autonomy and its own military, and the Beijing
central government would not interfere in its internal affairs; (4) Taiwan's
current socioeconomic system would not need to be changed, nor its life
style. Private property, business, and inheritance would be allowed.
Taiwan would also be able to continues its economic and cultural
relations with other nations; (5) Taiwan leaders would be second to
Beijing to occupy key national positions; (6) The central government in
Beijing would assist Taiwan if it encountered financial hardship; (7)
Taiwan residents who wanted to reside in the mainland would not be
discriminated against, and they would enjoy the freedom to move back
and forth across the Taiwan Strait; (8) Beijing would protect Taiwan
investment interests on the mainland; and (9) China's unification was the
responsibility of all Chinese, therefore Beijing welcomed suggestions
from Taiwan or elsewhere on how to attain the goal of reunification.
Oct. 1981 CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang issued open invitation to Taiwan's
leaders to visit mainland. He made an appeal to nationalist sentiment and
asked leaders in Taiwan to work with mainland for reunification of
China.
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Table 3-Continued
Year

Mainland China's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

Dec. 1982 Mainland China adopted article in constitution allowing for establishment
of "special administration regions" (SARs) for Taiwan with a high degree
of autonomy.
May 1983 Liao Chengzhi, the Beijing official in charge of relation with Taiwan, said
that Taiwan would be allowed to purchase US weapons and join ADB
after reunification.
Jun. 1983 Deng Xiaoping issued five "opinions" on unification, which included (1)
After unification, Beijing would not send military or administrative
personnel to Taiwan; (2) Taiwan could enjoy an independent legislative
authority and it could adopt its own law; (3) Taiwan could maintain its
own military so long as it felt threatened by the mainland; (4) Taiwan
could maintain some rights in conducting foreign affairs; and (5) Taiwan
could adopt a special flag and call itself "the Chinese Taiwan."
Jan. 1984

Deng Xiaoping proposed a "third united front" between CCP and KMT.

F eb.1984 Deng Xiaoping told former US national security advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski that Taiwan would be allowed to practice capitalism under
"one country, two systems" formula.
May 1984 Premier Zhao Ziyang proposed "one country, two system" formula as the
framework of Taiwan policy for China's peaceful unification.
Jun. 1984 Deng Xiaoping elaborated on the "one country, two system" formula as
meaning having socialism on the mainland and capitalism in Taiwan.
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Table 3-Continued
Sources: Compiled by the author according to the data represented in
Appendix:Peking-Taipei Interaction (1949-78), see Tzong-ho Bau,
"Taipei-Peking Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical
Analysis, 1949-88," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 90;
China Times (Taiwan) May 23, 1990, 9; Free China Journal, December 17,
1990, 1.
Table 4
Mainland China's Defection in the Second Phase
Year

Mainland China's Defection Actions/Announcements

Oct. 1982 Mainland China tested submarine-based missiles in sea north of Taiwan,
which was viewed as a threat to use force against Taiwan.
Jan.1983

Mainland China requested that Taiwan should be expelled for Asian
Development Bank (ADB).

Oct. 1984 Deng Xiaoping told former Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki that
Beijing would never promise to renounce the use of military forces
against Taiwan to reunify China.

Sources: Same as Table 3.
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Table 5
Taiwan's Defection in the Second Phase
Year

Taiwan' s Defection Actions/Announcements

1979-1980 Taiwan treated mainland China's conciliatory attitude as "united front
tactic" aimed at undermining Taiwan's ability to resist invasion from the
mainland. Taiwan rejects mainland China's urge for "three links" and
"four exchanges" by declaring "three nos" policy (no compromise, no
contacts, no negotiations with mainland).
Mar.-Apr. 1981 Twelfth National Congress of ruling Kuomintang reiterated the
reunification of China under Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's Three Principles of the
people. Congress declares that compromise with the enemy would invite
collapse.
Oct. 1981 President Chiang Ching-kuo rejected Ye's "nine opinions" proposal as
being "primarily intended to stop US arms sales to our country."
Aug. 1982 Madame Chiang Kai-shek rejected Liao's suggestion for bilateral talks
with a open letter.
Dec. 1982 President Chiang rejected "the special administrative region" (SAR)
proposal, citing the example of Tibet.
Jul. 1983 Taiwan asserted the reunification of China was only feasible if mainland
China gives up Communism and adopts Three Principles of the people.

Sources:

Compiled by the author according to the data represented in Appendix:
Peking-Taipei Interaction (1949-78), see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Peking
Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis,
1949-88," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 91-3.
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Table 6
Taiwan's Cooperation in the Second Phase
Year

Taiwan's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

1984-1985 Taiwan allowed the growth of indirect trade (through Hong Kong) with
mainland China which in 1984 exceeded US$500 million and reached
US$840 million in the period January-October 1985.
May 1986 A China Airlines Cargo plane and two crewmen were returned to Taiwan
by mainland China after negotiations in Hong Kong. Taiwan announced
that it would negotiate with mainland China for humanitarian reasons.

Sources: Same as Table 5.
Certainly, the actions or announcements of mainland China were not all
cooperation-oriented. That is, mainland China defected sometimes. But, these
defecting actions should be viewed as threats to force and urge Taiwan to play
cooperation. If so, the final payoff to the PRC would increase.
For example, in January 1983, mainland China requested that Taiwan should
be expelled for Asian Development Bank (ADB). In other words, mainland China
knew well that its relations with Taiwan was limited in the framework of Prisoner's
Dilemma, i.e., mainland China was playing a Prisoner's Dilemma game (because it
reserves the right to use force for the resolution of Taiwan issue) though it wanted to
raise mutual outcomes by unilateral cooperation.
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In theory, Bau provides an explanation for the shift of strategy in a Prisoner's
Dilemma game. He adopts Robert Jervis's theory and Robert Axelrod's concept of
"tit for tat". In fact, Jervis's theory may only be good for explaining the tendency for
the players to shift their strategies from defection to cooperation under certain
conditions, i.e., it can only account for the one-way shift of strategies, not the random
jumping between defection and cooperation. As for "tit for tat" formula, according to
its fundamental assumption--one player cooperates at the first move and goes with
what the other player's choice as the following steps, its explanatory power can only
extend to the games going in accordance with the assumption of "tit for tat". Then, in
our case, the random shift of strategies in the PRC as well as Taiwan seems beyond
its explanatory coverage. Compared to the preceding two methods, mixed strategy
theory can do a better job on this. By definition, a mixed strategy can be regarded as a
statement about "how many times on average a pure strategy is used." That is, it does
not care about the number of changes between strategies and promises to solve the
problem we mention above.

The Solution of the Game

Up to the end of this phase, on the one hand, due to the succession problem
(or power struggle) in Kuomintang after Chiang Ching-kl10's death, also because of
the pressure for political reform (especially constitutional reform) from the DPP,
Taiwan tended to be more cooperative in response to the PRC's good will. On the
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other hand, Taiwan's security, stability, and democratic development have gradually
replaced the concern for the claim of sovereignty to the mainland. To be sure, these
factors, exogenous or endogenous, forced Taiwan to formulate a relatively pragmatic
strategy when it developed unofficial or diplomatic relations with other countries,
especially with mainland China. Besides, the melting of tension and hostility between
the East and West blocs in the latter 1980s helped Taiwan to adopt a cooperative
strategy to negotiate with the PRC on the differences and issues of both sides instead
of military confrontation.
In short, Taiwan's unilateral transmutation in initial goals and strategies
resulted in the reorganization of the game from Prisoner's Dilemma to Chicken.
The Premature Cooperation Phase (1987-1995)
The Background of the Conflict
The year, 1987 marked a turning point in Taiwan's mainland China's policy.
Not until 1987 did Taiwan lift the ban that Taiwan residents could not visit their
relatives on mainland. President Lee's address of May 1990 implied a change in
mainland China policy:
If the Chinese Communist authorities can recognize the overall world
trend and the common hope of all Chinese, implement political
democracy and a free economic system, renounce the use of military
force in the Taiwan Strait, and not interfere with our development of
foreign relations on the basis of a one-China policy, we would be
willing , on a basis of equality , to establish channels of
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communication, and completely open up academic, cultural, economic,
trade, scientific, and technological exchange, to lay a foundation of
mutual respect, peace, and prosperity. 137
In other words, Taiwan set up four conditions to talk with mainland China on
reunification. They were that mainland China should:" (1) abandon its 'four cardinal
principles' (party leadership, the socialist road, proletarian dictatorship, and Marxism
Leninism and Mao's thought); (2) give up the option of using force against Taiwan;
(3) stop isolating Taiwan in the international community; and (4) introduce a
multiparty system on the mainland." 138 Since Taiwan obviously understood the
disadvantages of mutual confrontation, e.g., the isolation from the international
community and the less chance to influence the mainland, Taiwan began to learn
cooperation which guarantees to reduce tension, provide more room for its diplomatic
activities, and more importantly create the opportunity to influence mainland China
with democratic achievement and economic means as well.
In order to confirm its advocacy of a "one China" policy, Taiwan not only
identified the reunification of China as its long-term national goal, but also
established the National Unification Council in 1990 as the highest organ in charge of
unification affairs. On February 23, 1991, "The Guidelines for National Unification"
were formulated by the National Unification Council. The Guidelines divided the
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processes of unification into three stages: (1) The short term (a phase of exchange and
reciprocity); (2) The medium term (a phase of mutual trust and cooperation); and (3)
The long term (a phase of consultation and unification). 139
In respond to mainland China's cooperative proposal, and at the same time to
solve practical problems following the permission of unofficial contacts across the
Taiwan Strait, Taiwan created a private government-authorized organization, socalled Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 1991, which would make unofficial
contact with the mainland authorities for solving conflicts, e.g., trade or fishing
conflicts, between Taiwan and mainland China. Taiwan also showed its cooperation
by terminating the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist
Rebellion on May 1, 1991, which marked the end of the official state of war between
the Nationalists and the Communists.
In order to foster links and exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, mainland
China cooperated by establishing an Association For Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits (AFRATS) as a counterpart of SEF in December 1991. Mainland China hoped
that AFRATS would on the one hand, resolve practical problems resulting from the
opening of people-to-people exchanges, and one the other hand actively pave the way
for direct negotiation between the two sides.
In April 1993, under the spotlights of hundreds of reporters, the first Koo
Wang talks was held in Singapore. This was the first time that the heads of two
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private, but government-authorized organizations from Taiwan and mainland China
had met since the two parts of China were divided in late 1949. As a result, three
agreements and a joint announcement were signed on April 29, 1993 between Koo
Chen-fu, chairman of Straits Exchanges Foundation (SEF) and Wang Dachan,
president of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (AFRATS). Koo
said that "a historic step has been taken after nearly 40 years of separation," while
Wang expressed that communications and agreements are important for the
continuing and enhancing development of mainland China-Taiwan relations. 140
There are some major obstacles for both sides to press the reunification of
China though communications like Koo-Wang talks provide a friendly environment
for reciprocal exchanges. The difference between mainland China's and Taiwan's
definition of "one China", noted earlier, is an important obstacle. Mainland China
advocates that the reunification of China should be completed under the "one country,
two systems" formula. Mainland China prefers Taiwan's status as a "special
administrative region" after reunification. More importantly, the PRC strongly
opposes Taiwan's search for international identification by promoting its "flexible"
diplomacy or a "one China, two governments" policy.
Taiwan, by contrast would like to be treated as an equal political entity rather
than as a local government while it negotiates with mainland China. In other words,

Tammy C. Peng, "Historic Meeting Products Four Agreements," Free China
Journal, vol. 10, no. 31 (April 30, 1993): 1.
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Taiwan insists on the sovereignty it has over the current territories and recognition of
the reality of a divided China. Taiwan does not intend to challenge mainland China's
sovereignty on mainland. Other obstacles such as differences in political ideology, or
in way of life, also seem impossible to iron out in the near future.
For a long time, there have existed fundamental disagreements over how to
treat the Taiwan issue among the political elite on the mainland. Deng Xiaoping has
tended to support use of force to settle the Taiwan issue under certain contingencies.
In late summer 1990, when he met with Chen Yun in the Western Hills of Beijing,
Deng reportedly said:
As regards to Taiwan, we should still be prepared with the military
option. There are two sets of circumstances under which we shall use
force. The first one is foreign intervention. The second one is Taiwan
declaring independence. It seems that now it is not very likely for
foreign forces to intervene, but the danger of Taiwan declaring
independence does exist. 141
In comparison to Deng, Chen Yun seems to be much more disinclined in
using force in regard Taiwan. After hearing Deng's statement, Chen reacted:
We should not use force abroad during the period of the Eighth Five
Year Plan so as to maintain a strong financial position to develop our
economic base.
As regards Taiwan, we should not adopt the military option. Such an
option if taken will affect our economic development and damage our
international reputation. As long as Taiwan capital comes over to the
Mainland and Taiwan trades with the Mainland, gradually leading to
the formation of a unified market, it will be impossible for Taiwan to
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become independent. Unification is only a matter of time. 142
The PLA leadership in the Military Affairs Committee also tends to favor of
the use of force in preventing Taiwan from realizing independence. For example,
during the Gulf War of January 1991, three Communist elders led by Wang Zhen,
Vice President of the PRC, recommended that the PRC should take advantage of the
U.S. intervention into the Middle East to "liberate Taiwan." However, Deng Xiaoping,
Jiang Zemin, and Li Peng were opposed to this suggestion. 143
In June 1995, mainland China unilaterally announced a shut-down of all
channels for negotiations, e.g., the regular meeting between SEF and AFRATS, and
stated this was a consequence of President Lee's US travel. What is more, in order to
force Taiwan to change its existing foreign policy, i.e., flexible diplomacy, and to
undermine Lee's prestige, mainland China held two missile exercises around the East
sea, 120 miles away for Taiwan in July and August as well.
Mainland China's dramatic change in Taiwan policy, i.e., dramatically less
cooperation, really disturbed Taiwan on the eve of elections for the Legislative Yuan
in December 1995, and presidential elections in March 1996.
The Likely Payoffs of the Game
The relations between Taiwan and the PRC can be displayed as Matrix 17
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(Figure 24).
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Matrix 17: The Premature Cooperation Phase.

The mainland China-Taiwan relations up to the third phase witnessed a·
dramatic transformation, i.e., in game-theoretical term the framework for mutual
interactions had transmuted from Prisoner's Dilemma to Chicken. Compared to the
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actions of the players in Prisoner's Dilemma, both sides tended to adopt cooperation
more than defection in Chicken. It is possible to reach a binding agreement
(cooperative pair) which guaranteed both sides to procure the second best payoff in
the game. According to Matrix 17, through mutual cooperation, Taiwan may
gradually achieve sufficient "international space" or recognition for the best result.
Also, Taiwan may dedicate to peaceful transformation on the mainland by economic
means and political propaganda for democracy. From the perspective of mainland
China, rapprochement with Taiwan may allow it to take advantage of Taiwan's
financial strength and human resources for the economic reform and development. In
addition, mainland China can encourage Taiwan to accept Deng Xiaoping's proposal
-the reunification of China under "one China, two systems" framework.
The Players' Preference Orderings and Strategies
To Taiwan, the outcome of defection (DD) is evaluated as the worse of all
possible payoffs. In other words, Taiwan as a rational actor would like to temporarily
succumb to mainland China's requirement, e.g., to change the current policy or to
reaffirm the attitude to "one China" principle, rather than go back the military
confrontation or invite the possible outbreak of war. By contrast, mainland China as a
stronger competitor can bear the losses due to being double crossed. Therefore, it is
highly possible for mainland China to cooperate on the surface (in words) and to
defect in reality. Even so, it is irrational for the PRC to launch military campaigns
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against Taiwan. According to the PRC's self-evaluation, the cost for the taking
Taiwan by force would be around US $200 billion, but taking Taiwan would earn
$120 billion in return; that is, the net loss to the PRC in a successful military action to
take Taiwan would be $80 billion. It also estimated that the PRC would lose 1,500
aircraft and suffer 3 million casualties. 144
Besides, the U.S. expected intervention into Taiwan issue still shadowed the
PRC's resolution to launch any military action though the PRC realized that the U.S.
is eager to need the cooperation of China in global events. According to the analysis
of National Bureau of Asian and Soviet Research, the PRC plays a significant role
which favors the U.S. interests, e.g., it has contributed to the international isolation of
Iraq, made critical efforts to compel the Kroner Ronge to accept the emerging
Cambodian political settlement, normalized relations with Indonesia, and put forward
an essential proposal for shelving conflicting sovereignty claims to the islands of the
South China sea and promoting joint exploitations of the natural resources in the
vicinity of these islands. 145 Obviously, the United States tries its best to avoid
involving into the dilemma, i.e., to choose either the PRC or Taiwan. In tradition, the
United States strongly supports Taiwan to adhere to the way of capitalism and
democratic development. Although there is no governmental relations between both
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countries, the Taiwan Relations Act binds both together in many perspectives. By
contrast, the Sino-U.S. relations are based on three joint communiques in which the
U.S. recognizes that Taiwan is part of China and the PRC has given its word to solve
Taiwan issue in peaceful means. To be sure, the U.S. attitudes in the future would
directly or indirectly affect the PRC and Taiwan in choosing the strategy to deal with
each other.
The data with respect to the interaction between mainland China and Taiwan
for this phase are displayed in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10.
Table 7
Taiwan's Cooperation in the Third Phase
Year

Taiwan's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

Jul. 1987

Taiwan lift the ban on tourist trips to Hong Kong and Macao, and
allows reprinting and sale of selected nonpolitical mainland academic
publications.

Jul. 1987

Taiwan allowed mainland medicinal herbs to be directly imported
through Hong Kong.

Sep. 1987

Taiwan allowed Taiwan residents to visit their relatives on mainland.

Mar. 1988

Premier Yu Guohua noted that Taiwan may adjust the current "three
nos" principle if mainland China renounced the use of force against
Taiwan, the "four cardinal principles," and "one country, two systems"
formula.
Taiwan claimed that it may reconsider policy on direct shipping, mail,
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Table 7-Continued
Year

Taiwan's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

and air transportation links.
Jul. 1988

Taiwan drew up draft regulation for dealing with mainland's application
to attend funerals in Taiwan.
President Lee Teng-hui claimed that Taiwan may adjust ''three nos"
policy if mainland China would stop isolating Taiwan in the
international community.

Aug. 1988

Taiwan considered lifting the ban on news reporting about mainland
and plans to allow low-ranking public employees to visit mainland.
The Mainland Affairs Task Force was established by the Executive
Yuan, with Vice premier Shih Chi-Yang as Convener.

Sep. 1988

Taiwan relaxed restriction on mainlanders visiting sick relatives in
Taiwan.
Taiwan lift the ban on attendance at international nongovernmental
conferences and participation in sporting events on mainland.

Oct. 1988

KMT decided in principle to allow mainland students studying abroad
to visit Taiwan.
Taiwan high court ruled that direct trade with mainland is no
"rebellion." Taiwan allows mainlanders to inherit property of relatives
in Taiwan and permits Taiwan residents who give birth or get married
on mainland to obtain a birth or marriage certificate in Taiwan.
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Table 7-Continued
Year

Taiwan's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

Mar. 1990

President Lee Teng-hui said that he opposed Taiwan independence.

Oct. 1990

The National Unification Council was established under the Presidential
Office; the Mainland Affairs Council was established by the
executive Yuan.

Feb. 1991

Taiwan formulated the Guidelines for National Unification. Taiwan
establishes private and government-authorized "Straits Exchange
Foundation." (SEF)

May 1991

Taiwan put an end on the "Period of Mobilization for Suppression of
the Communist Rebellion."

Dec. 1991

Taiwan allowed mainland-Taiwan couples who has married for two
years to apply for residence in Taiwan.

Mar. 1992

Taiwan allowed mainland antiques to be exhibited in Taiwan's
galleries.

Apr. 1993

Taiwan allowed banks to contact with mainland financial institutions
and establishes branches on mainland.

May 1993

Taiwan welcomed mainland outstanding scientists to visit or cooperate
with Taiwan's research institutions for certain projects.

Jun. 1995

Taiwan reiterated that it would stick to "one China" principle and
enhances the unification of China.
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Table ?-Continued
Sources:

Compiled by the author according to the data represented in Appendix:
Peking-Taipei Interaction (1949-78), see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Peking
Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis, 194988," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 93-5; Free China
Review, vol. 41, no. 1 (January 1991): 15; Tasi Cheng-Wen & Lin Chia
Cheng, Political relations across the Taiwan Straits (Taipei: Insitute for
National Policy Research, 1989); Free China Journal (May 7, 1991): 1-2;
(July 23, 1991): 6; (August 23, 1991): 1; Across-Straits Relations
Explanation, (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1994), pp. 203-225.
Table 8
Taiwan's Defection in the Third Phase

Year

Taiwan's Defection Actions/Announcements

Dec. 1987

President Chiang Ching-Kuo in interview with Global Views claimed
that reunification is only possible under Three Principles of the People.

Jul. 1988

President Lee Teng-hui indicated that Taiwan must adhere to "three
nos" for time being to deal with mainland China's united front policy.

Sep. 1988

KMT expelled legislator Hu Chiuyan for contacting top officials
during visit on mainland.

May 1989

Taiwan approved the "Measures to Support the Democracy Movement
on the Mainland."

May 1990

President Lee Teng-hui claimed that talks must be carried out on an
equal government-to-government basis, not between the KMT and the
CCP.
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Table 8-Continued
Year

Taiwan's Defection Actions/Announcements

Dec. 1990

Sources:

Chu Chi-Ying, Direct of the KMT's Department of Cultural Affairs,
rejected mainland China's suggestion to hold high and !ow-level
"party-to-party" talks in Taiwan on bilateral relations and reunification
under "one country, two systems" framework.

Compiled by the author according to the data represented in Appendix:
Peking-Taipei Interaction (1949-78), see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Peking
Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis, 194988," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 93-5; Free China
Review, vol. 41, no. 1 (January 1991): 15; Tasi Cheng-Wen & Lin Chia
Cheng, Political relations across the Taiwan Straits (Taipei: Insitute for
National Policy Research, 1989); Free China Journal (May 7, 1991): 1-2;
(July 23, 1991): 6; (August 23, 1991): 1.

Table 9
Mainland China's Cooperation in the Third Phase
Year

Mainland China's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

Jun. 1988

Mainland China announced regulations on cross-Strait marriages.

Jul. 1988

Mainland China started campaign to study Taiwan's law. Mainland
China claimed that it wishes to discuss possible new constitution and
conditions for renouncing reunification by force with Taiwan.

Aug. 1988

Mainland China's supreme court ruled that people in Taiwan have

143
Table 9-Continued
Mainland China's Cooperation Actions/Announcements

Year

same right to inherit property as mainlanders and issues set of
principles for dealing with cross-Strait bigamy and remarriage.
Sep. 1988

Hong Kong press reported that mainland China is ready to establish a
body for dealing with cross-Strait trade issues which could help
increase benefits of both sides.

Jul. 1989

Jiang Z}temin, CCP general secretary, reaffirmed the "one country,
two systems" formula and reassured that mainland China would not
impost the socialist system on Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Jan. 1991

Yang Shangkuqn, National Chiefman, urged talks between the CCP
and the KMT.

Dec. 1991

Mainland China established Association For Relations Across the
Taiwan Straits (AFRATS).

Sources:

c. h11irrl'\c?-1"

Compiled by the author according to the data represented in Appendix:
Peking-Taipei Interaction (1949-78), see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Peking
Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis, 194988," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 93-5; China Times
(Taiwan), May 23, 1990, 9; Free China Journal, December 17, 1990, l;
Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), September 1991, 5.
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Table 10
Mainland China's Defection in the Third Phase
Year

Mainland China's Defection Actions/Announcements

Dec. 1987

Mainland China revised its 1979 "War Plan to Liberate Taiwan" to
include the possibility of using force to get Taiwan to the negotiating
table should the prospects of talks look bleak.

Jan. 1988

Mainland China asked mainland people to beware of ideological
contamination by visitors from Taiwan.

Jan.-Jun. 1988 Mainland China held military exercises in South China sea aimed at
training it troops in island warfare.
Feb. 1991

Mainland China reiterated that it would not recognize Taiwan as a
political entity.

Jun. 1995

Mainland China shut down the regular meetings between SFRATS and
SEF.

Jul. 1995

Mainland China held the First round missile exercises around the East
sea from July 21 to 28.

Aug. 1995

Mainland China launched the Second round missile exercises around
the East sea from August 15 to 25.

Sep. 1995

Jiang Zhemin noted that the Chinese Communist Party and the
government of People's Republic of China strongly insist on
maintaining the sovereignty and the integrity of territory by all means.

Oct. 1995

Qian Qichen stated that Chinese affairs do not need the mediation for a
third party, the contact between political leaders from both sides does
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Year

Mainland China's Defection Actions/Announcements

not need an international conference.
Oct. 1995

Sources:

Jiang Zhemin noted "if separatism· emerges on Taiwan, whether
stemming from international hostile forces or from local separatist
forces, then we might use nonpeaceful means to achieve
reunification."

Compiled by the author according to the data represented in Appendix:
Peking-Taipei Interaction (1987-88), see Tzong-ho Bau, "Taipei-Peking
Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict: A Game-Theoretical Analysis, 194988," Issues and Studies, vol. 27, no. 10 (October 1991): 93-5; China Post,
Free Times (Taiwan), July 20, August 14, September 4, 1995; Central Daily
News (Taiwan), October 2, 16, 1995.
To be sure, Table 7 indicates Taiwan's resolution to cooperate with

mainland China though the scope of contact in practice is limited to nongovernmental
and nonpolitical affairs. Besides, Taiwan intention to participate in the international
community is strong and obvious, e.g., President Lee's American travel. In contrast to
mainland China's constant position on "one China," Taiwan tends to not be
constrained by it in order to struggle for more advantages in economic or political
arena from international community. Due to the implementation of four
modernization and the rapid economic growth, mainland China can not help
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maintaining friendly and peaceful environment in order to attract more investments
from Taiwan as well as other countries; but on the other hand, it adopts hard line
about the "Taiwan issue," that is, it would give in any possible challenge to the
sovereignty of "one China."
Tables 9 and 10 may back up our inference. Mainland China urges Taiwan to
exchange and talk, on the one hand; and it confirms its hard line about the "Taiwan
issue," on the other hand. Put it another way, mainland China is eager to cooperate
with Taiwan or other nations as to economic or even political affairs which have
nothing to do with the sovereignty of China because it knows well that cooperation
may not only create a beneficial situation for Chinese Modernization in the short-term
but also enhance the opportunity for the peaceful reunification of China in the long
term.
The Solution of the Game
Since Taiwan made security its top priority, it would tend to concede the
PRC's political or military threats on specific issues ( e.g., the movement of Taiwan
independence) to a certain degree. However, Taiwan would and could play defection
on certain concerns like the pursuit of international space which would promote
Taiwan's prosperity and the welfare of twenty-one million Taiwan residents in the
future when it got the outside help like the support from the United States.
In contrast, the goals set in the 1980s, especially the reinforcement of four
modernizations and the solution of the Taiwan issue, continue occupying the PRC's
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agenda for the 1990s. For the economic reform's sake, the PRC would stick to
cooperate with the business community of Taiwan to achieve necessary economic
resources, e.g., investments, management skills, and high technologies. However,
observed from the political perspective, the PRC's attitude toward Taiwan is
ambiguous. On the one hand, the PRC not just continues to request for enlarging the
scope of exchanges but to propose the peaceful reunification under the framework of
"one china, two systems" as well. But, on the other hand, the PRC still adopts a
strong position regarding the solution of the Taiwan issue. For example, by aggressive
means like missile excises, the PRC intended to depress Taiwan while it suspected
that Taiwan may attempt to create the image about "one China, one Taiwan" or "two
Chinas" and finally lead the way to independence by so-called "pragmatic
diplomacy." In other words, in this Chicken game, the PRC obviously chose a mixed
strategy because it believed that the relatively maximum expected payoff would be
ensured, i.e., Taiwan would maintain close relations with the PRC, especially in
economic perspective; and at the same time, the likelihood of Taiwan independence
would be eliminated.
Up to the end of this phase, for the security sake, Taiwan has made some
concessions to the PRC's political extortions following the threats of military
maneuver. For example, to reduce the PRC's suspicion regarding the intention of
Taiwan independence, Koumintang took advantage of all available occasions,
national or international, continuously reclaimed that the reunification of China in the
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long run in peaceful means is the terminal goal of Taiwan democratic development.
Besides, in order not to provoke the PRC, Taiwan is in self-restraint and cautious in
dealing with the maintenance and development of diplomatic relations with other
countries. On the other hand, Taiwan is eager to strive for international supports to
protest against the PRC's threat-oriented missile tests which would not only affect
Taiwan's stability and security but also cause the needless panic and intention around
the west Pacific rim.
Since the PRC's position is relatively superior to Taiwan's in such a Chicken
game, it would adhere to a mixed strategy (probably increase the number of adopting
defection) for sure. Reportedly, the political leaders on the mainland are moving
toward a Taiwan policy of "the threat of the use of force" coupled with the offer of
economic advantage to the business community in Taiwan. 146 By contrast, Taiwan
may be contained to play more cooperation under the PRC's pressure. Or, Taiwan
may begin to play firm to a certain extent only when it achieves outside help like the
U.S. commitment. If so, then the construction of the game would change from
Chicken back to Prisoner's Dilemma. That is, due to the increasing of political
resources, Taiwan may prefer to play Prisoner's Dilemma rather than Chicken when it
gradually recognizes that the payoff from defection would overweigh that from
unilateral cooperation or capitulation.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, mainland China-Taiwan relations over the past years are
divided

into three phases: (1) the military confrontation phase (1949-1978); (2) the

peaceful competition phase (1979-86); and (3) the premature cooperation phase
(1987-1995). We adopt Bau's models, Deadlock and Prisoner's Dilemma, as the basic
frameworks for analyzing the interactions between both sides in the first and second
phases. Two major shortcomings within Bau's models are pinpointed as follows: (1)
Bau takes advantage of different models to deal with

the relations under the

individual phases, but he does not provide any credible evidence

from the theory

perspective to explain why and how he can shift game models from one to another;
and (2) Bau adopts Axelrod's concept of "Tit for Tat" to explain the policymakers'
decision to alter their strategies from defection to cooperation and vice versa during
the game. In fact, the concept of mixed strategies is superior to "Tit for Tat" in
answering the strategy-shifting question.
The long-run interactions between mainland China and Taiwan witnessed the
players' dramatic change in primary goals, attitudes, and strategies in correspondence
with the interactions of external and internal factors. For example, in decades, Taiwan
called for the counterattack of the mainland and competed with the PRC for the
sovereignty of China in the international arena; but since the aftermath of Lee Teng
hui's succession to Chiang Chin-kuo in 1988, Taiwan tended to pay more emphases
on its national security and economic development instead on the struggle for the
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sovereignty of China with the PRC. To capture the transformation on initial goals as
well as strategies, except adopting Bau's models, we formulate Chicken as the
fundamental structure for describing the relations in the third phase.
One of the significant findings in our analyses is that we recognize the likely
influence exerted by the potential third party like the U.S. and the U.S.S.R on the
policymakers in both sides. Under the framework of two-by-two models, the U.S. or
the U.S.S.R. is treated as an ally to Taiwan or mainland China. In other words, we
take their possible leverage into account as one of exogenous factors to the
policymakers of both sides.
Through applying two major game theoretical hypotheses such as: (1) the
more opportunity for the players to communicate prior to or during a game, the more
likelihood for them to cooperate with one another; (2) compared to Prisoner's
Dilemma, Chicken is more conducive to cooperation, we have generated a particular
hypothesis, i.e., Chicken is more suitable than Prisoner's Dilemma in explaining
mainland China-Taiwan relations in the post-Cold War era. On the other hand,
conducting our descriptions and analyses based on the analyses of historical events
and data, in this chapter to some extent we have explained and inferred what
strategies were adopted by mainland China and Taiwan, and why and how strategies
change in long-run interactions.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Summary
The primary design of this study had the goal of examining the capacity of
game theory (especially game-theoretical models) to help in the analysis of
international crises. Based on the significant characteristics of game models, one
objective was to generate a few testable hypotheses that could contribute to our
understanding of game theory and allow us to analyze mainland China-Taiwan
relations from the perspectives of interest conflict not merely from the descriptions of
documentary data. It is assumed that we can achieve the ostensible objectives when
we are familiar with the crucial assumptions and characteristics of game theory and
the applications of game models to a given conflict situation.
While managing this case study, I tried to formulate a practical approach (or
so-called dynamic model) to decode a complicated long-term conflict like mainland
China-Taiwan relations based on the random mixture of game models. Simply
speaking, this experiment may help rectify a dominant and stubborn image
concerning game theory: Game theorists are liable to choose one specific model
(Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken) to explain a given conflict-in other words, no
matter what the conflict, the period of time does not matter to the applications of
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game models. In this thesis, the point is made that as time goes by due to the
interactions of internal or external factors, the structure of the game may be
transmuted by the players' initial goals. If so, the combination of multi-models as a
comparative approach would be much more capable in dealing with the evolution of a
given conflict than one specific model. In addition, the definitions of cooperation and
defection made by Bau as well as Snyder are adopted as the major criteria for
classifying and analyzing history events and relevant data, though we realize the
reality of diplomatic options is difficult to be examined by a simple two-poles
continuous (cooperation and defection) scale.
In Chapter II, game theory is defined as an approach to analyze the problem of
strategy selection in conflict situations where strategies are interdependent. Two
crucial elements, the concept of rationality and expected utility theory, are exposed
and discussed in detail. Since game theory is viewed as a type of the rational choice
approach, I have clarified the close association between them. By comparison, game
theory shares the similar assumptions with the rational choice approach and conveys
itself into a relatively integral theory. For example, the rational choice approach
assumes that an actor will behave based of his own preference orderings. In addition,
it takes advantage of rationality as "a behavior statement" which takes "the goals of
an individual as given ." Rational choice theory does not attempt to decide whether
the goals are rational or not and explain where individual preferences come from. It
does "describes how those goals would be attained efficiently and stipulates a
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consistency between preferences and actions." 147 The difference between the rational
choice theory and game theory is that the latter pays high attention to how a rational
actor attains his initial goals under a given situation, especially through concise and
well-constructed game models. More important, game theory concentrates on dealing
with strategic situations in which the actors' strategies are interdependent.
In Chapter III, the study moved from the essential assumptions and concepts
of game theory to two kinds of game-theoretical models: zero-sum games and non
zero-sum games. First, we identify the Deadlock game model as a general type of
zero-sum game. We describe some characteristics of Deadlock as: (a) the players are
totally interest-conflicting among themselves; (b) each player has his own dominant
strategy with which neither player can force the other to accept the unequal payoff,
the best for one and the worst for the other; (c) due to the lack of mutual interest, the
payoff of defection is better than that of cooperation. Next, I introduce and compare
two well-known non-zero-sum game models, Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. In
general, these game models share two common features: (1) there exist conflict and
mutual interest among the players; (2) cooperation guarantees a higher payoff than
defection. The players in a Prisoner's Dilemma game find it easier to identify a
dominant strategy that may

ensure the second worse payoffs than others in a

Chicken game. However, due to the lack of mutual trust, it is difficult to reach a
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binding agreement (or a stable equilibrium) among the players in Prisoner's Dilemma.
By contrast, it seems possible to encourage or compel the players to cooperate with
one another in Chicken because the players tend to avoid the crash result. Several
likely solutions to game models are mentioned in the final part of this chapter. The
"tit for tat" strategy and mixed strategies by which we try to explain why and how
the players shift their strategies in an iterated game.
In Chapter IV, to evaluate the capacity of game models in dealing with
international conflicts, we reviewed three previous case studies: the Southwest Pacific
Conflict of 1943, the Berlin Crisis of 1958-60, and Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
Through analyses and comparisons, we showed that the characteristics and
explanatory power of a certain type of game model are suitable for a specific conflict,
e.g., the decision-makers' goals and reactions during Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 are
better explained in terms of Chicken than Prisoner's Dilemma.
In Chapter V,

the evolution of mainland China-Taiwan relations is separated

into three phases: (1) the military confrontation phase (1949-1978); (2) the peaceful
competition phase (1979-86); and (3) the premature cooperation phase (1987-1995).
To meet the different feature of each phase, we assign Deadlock as the basic
framework of analyses for the first phase, Prisoner's Dilemma for the second phase,
and Chicken for the last phase.
This arrangement alludes to the game that would transform from one specific
type to another when the players, unilaterally or jointly, alter their expected goals,
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preference orderings, and strategies by the changes of exogenous and endogenous
factors. For example, due to the diplomatic victory in the 1970s, also because of the
launching of economic reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the PRC began
to play a Prisoner's Dilemma game instead of a Deadlock game after 1979. The
change of strategies in mainland China directly caused the reorganization of payoff
matrixes, on the other hand, tempted Taiwan to adjust its strategies and preference
ordering for the sake of maximizing self-interest. Also, we point out that two
contrasting concepts should be taken into account, the subjective recognition of the
players and the objective constraint of the situation, when we choose a game model
for a given situation.
During our analysis, we observe that Taiwan's national priority shifted
dramatically. In the very beginning of military confrontation stage, Taiwan insisted on
competing with mainland China for the right to represent China in the international
community. Up to 1994 the government on Taiwan announced that Taiwan would no
longer challenge the PRC's sovereignty in the mainland . In other words, since the
aftermath of President Lee's succession to Chiang Chin-kuo in 1988, rather than
stick to the struggle for the sovereignty of China in the international arena, Taiwan
was inclined to emphasize its economic development and national security.
The possible influence and intervention exerted by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
on the policy making procedures of both sides over time were considered, so that it
would meet our desires to analyze the strategic interdependence between mainland
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China and Taiwan under the framework of game models. Based on the analyses of
historical events and data, we suggest several hypotheses: (a) the more opportunity for
the players to communicate before or during a game, the greater the likelihood that
they will cooperate with one another; (b) compared to Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken
is more conducive to cooperation; and (c) Chicken is more suitable than Prisoner's
Dilemma in explaining mainland China-Taiwan relations in the post-Cold War era.
Limitations and Advantages of Game Theory
Overall, game-theoretical models were criticized as too simple to display all
the complexity of social phenomena. For example, Mckelvey and Rosenthal argue
that although game theory has had a substantial impact upon political science at the
"conceptual level," only rarely has it led to "rigorous empirical analysis of real
world behavior." 148 Such a critique obviously refers to the problem of the scope of
applying game theory. They set the scope of applications according to the definition
of game theory. That is, game theory is applicable to situations in which the players
are assumed to be rational and able to make decisions based on their own preference
orderings. More explicitly, whether the scope of applications is narrow (or wide)
depends on

the

relevant assumptions, axioms, and hypotheses organized and

developed in the theory. In general, the rational choice theory, with a wide scope of
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applications, explains diverse human behavior by means of simple assumptions-
individuals are rational in nature and would behave rationally to pursue optimal
outcomes. In contrast, game theory set up a relatively narrow scope. The scope is
restrained based on the following assumptions: (a) their personal preferences lead the
rational players, i.e., they are supposed to adopt the action that not only would meet
their preference orderings but also increase the expected utility in return; and (b) the
players' strategies are interdependent, i.e., the payoffs are decided by the interactions
among players' choices. Under such assumptions, game theory may define rationality
as an integral and effective connection between means and goals. And, the function of
game theory lies in explaining and predicting how the actors behave rationally.
Typically, psychological or dispositional approaches are required to answer
questions such as: Why does an individual have a specific preference ordering? How
does tradition (or culture) influence individual behavior in a certain way? Game
theory does other things in comparison to cultural approaches. Simply speaking, game
theory places high emphasis on the choices or responses of a rational actor under a
given conflict circumstance in which the actors' decisions are interdependent. In other
words, since individual preferences can be changed under certain conditions, game
theorists believe that it is not the responsibility of game theory to trace the origins of a
specific preference (or goal) and prove one preference over the other. As for personal
preferences, game theorists are likely to highlight that rational actors should and could
be better off if they follow their personal preferences.
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To be sure, psychological approaches could provide other perspectives
regarding the similar issue which game theory addresses. For example, Johnston
formulates the theory of "strategic culture" to clarify and analyze the relationship
between contemporary Chinese strategic principles and actions. He contends that
Chinese strategic culture nourished by ancient traditions in philosophy and statecraft
is substantially different from what are portrayed as Western traditions. Through the
analysis of strategic culture, he addresses the following question: To what extent
has this strategic culture affected upon decision-makers' choices, accommodation,
defense, or offense, when China is confronted with external "threats". In other words,
according to the concept "strategic culture", Johnston argues that a state's strategic
behavior is less responsive to others' choices and a certain decision is made under a
certain situation in which decision-makers share similar ideology. He notes that the
concept of strategy interdependence does not root deeply in the policy makers' mind
in contrast to the concept of strategic culture. To be sure, a theory like strategic
culture would easily draw our attention to related topics such as the nature of conflict
in human affairs, the nature of the enemy, and the efficacy of violence. However, its
weakness lies in the difficulty in identifying the dependent and independent variables
when we try to confirm the relevant elements for strategic culture and the interactions
between strategic culture and political elites. 149 Moreover, the model of strategic
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culture may fail to highlight the importance of interdependent relations among
participants. In contrast to psychological approaches or strategic cultural theory, game
theory is relatively weak in its ability to cover the variety of elements related to a
conflict

situation,

such

as

individual

differences,

leaderships,

traditions,

socioeconomic constraints, and the like. This fact implies that the capacity of game
theory in explaining conflict might decline when more actors and options get involved
in the structure of the game. To be sure, this is the limitation of game theory.
However, on the other hand, the characteristics of game theory (e.g., the assumptions
of rational actors, clear-cut choices, and expected payoffs) really allow us to clarify,
in Axelrod's words, "some of the subtle features of the interaction [especially among
goals, actions, and results]-features which might otherwise be lost in the maze of
complexity of the highly particular circumstances."
Binmore argues that game theorists in particular are ready to provide advice on
two distinct types of problem. The first suggestion is related to the concern of "how
best to play a given game." The second one is to determine the nature of the game to
be played with a view to ensuring that "its play will not lead to socially undesirable
outcomes," which conflict with the objectives of those for whom the game is
designed. The former refers to the players' consideration on choosing a relatively
better strategy to interact with one another during the game. By contrast, the latter
.
.
.
.
.
pomts out the importance of the assumptlon--the p1ayers are rat1ona1 m the game. 150
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In his autobiography-like introduction with respect to the entry and application
of game theory in political science, Riker recognizes two fundamental features of
game theory. First, he notes that game theory reflects and corresponds to the
uncompromising rationalism existing in the real world. Unlike other approaches
obviously targeting events or phenomena as the subjects for discussion, game theory
gives attention to rational people who are eager to achieve personal goals. To be sure,
probably due to the preference difference and the choices of strategies among the
players, game theory cannot guarantee that each player's choice would result in the
attainment of the preferred goals, according to the structure of the game, because the
players' actions affected each other in determining the outcome. In other words,
rational players adopting rational means in pursuit of preferred outcomes might end
with an irrational consequence. Second, Riker argues game theory shows the
significance of free choice to some extent, though the number of choices may be
constrained by a given conflict situation, i.e., the structure 9f the game. In general,
Game theory suggests that the players, knowing their preferences, estimate how
alternative strategies might satisfy those preferences. Also, game theory says that the
outcomes would directly derive from individual choices and the interactions among
them--not from some exogenous plan for the world, not on some built-in irrational
propensity, just on free human choice. What Riker wants to say is that the most
important contribution of game theory to political science is its allowance
for "generalization about human choice in a way that admits of more or less precise
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determination of the form of human goals in particular social circumstances (the
structure of the game)." 151
In Snyder's words, the pnmary advantage of game-theoretical models
( especially two-by-two games) lies in its concise description of "the basic structure of
the crisis situation," i.e., the game. In short, to behave rationally in game theory
means that the players as competitors are expected to act to maximize by all means
the achievement of their own postulated goals. The outcome depends not only on
chance but also on the actions of other players, sometimes conflicting and sometimes
cooperative.152
The Possibility for Constructing a Dynamic Game Model
Typically, facing a historical event or an ongoing conflict situation, game
theorists usually apply a single game model to explain and predict the players'
preference orderings, strategies, and the likely payoffs. To be sure, the Prisoner's
Dilemma is a favorite model because it promises to simplify complicated conflict
into succinct strategy interactions among the players by means of easily understood
framework, especially with a two-by-two formula.
Through the application of the Prisoner's Dilemma game theorists can (at the
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first stage) recognize the players' preference orderings, the strategies open to the
players, and the likely payoffs assigned to the players. Then, they can analyze a
couple of variations for the strategy combination. Game theorists may take advantage
of the characteristics of Prisoner's Dilemma to explain why and how a rational actor
should or could do, not only in accordance with his preference orderings but also
under the constraint of the game. For example, they may suggest that the consequence
of DD would be a relatively determined outcome in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
because the players lack of mutual trust; thus making a binding agreement which
promises to increase the expected payoff for the players is impossible.
The application of a static model to a given situation in principle allows the
researchers to quickly highlight the critical part of a conflict, e.g., who the actors are,
what the actors want, and what they can do to achieve their initial goals with the
lowest cost. Also, the researchers can take advantage of a single model to capture the
conflict to the extent in which some key factors are scrutinized by abandoning
secondary materials. Besides, in this way, game theorists could offer a couple of
dominant predictions regarding the further evolution of the situation.
Of course, game theorists assume that the situation they are addressing should
and would be contained under the framework of a reiterated game. That is, a conflict
may last a period of time, not just happen in a brief moment. Those who apply a
single model to a long-run conflict, may encounter a significant critique. Such
critiques could include: As time goes by, how can we use only one model to explain
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the players' changes in goals and strategies while their preference orderings and the
assigned payoffs are transmuted in association with the transformations of
endogenous and exogenous factors in the game? In addition, game theorists assume
that the players are viewed as equal competitors in a game. What will happen if the
players are not equal? Is there any game model which can fit such a variation? Could
it be possible that one player will play Chicken while the others are flexible enough to
play Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken in a game? If so, what would this game look
like?
Obviously, it seems beyond the explanatory power of a single model to solve
these two fundamental problems. To solve this problem, Bau takes the first
experiment in which he uses three models (seriously speaking two, Deadlock and
Prisoner's Dilemma) to decode the complex and continuous Taiwan/PRC relations,
though he does not explicitly account for why the models are shifting over time. His
approach is unlike other game theorists who merely adopt one "dominant" model, e.g.,
Prisoner's Dilemma to analyze general international crises.
To bridge the gap between the shift of model and the dynamic relations, in the
preceding chapter I provide explanations for why we separate the relations into three
phases and why certain type of model is assigned to a selected phase. For example,
one of the reasons for our assigning Chicken as the basic framework for the
explanation of mainland China-Taiwan relations in the third phase is compared to
Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken is much more conductive to promote a binding
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agreement for cooperation on both sides because of costly penalties (or negative
payoffs) like war, but also that Taiwan is liable to follow the cooperative strategy
(although sometimes it pretends to play Prisoner's Dilemma , i.e., stick to defecting
strategy) because of lack of political resources and the consideration of security as
alike.
To this point, this case study has examined the hypothesis (based on the
mixture of two concepts, i.e., the players' subjective recognition in the game and the
objective constraint of the conflict situation): the game should and could be identified
as Chicken when one player plays Chicken despite other players' strategy, either
cooperation or defection.
Such a dynamic multi-game model approach may solve some problems related
to game theory to a certain degree. However, it also leaves problems for further
resolution. For example, it may be that we cannot totally capture the real conflict
situation by means of three types of game models (other models may be needed).
Also, three classic game models under the two-by-two framework in nature are short
of the capacity to successfully deal with the influence import on the players of a
potential third party over the players. In short, we may need to formulate a sub-game
model to cope with the relations among allies when we apply a multi-game model to
expose the interactions between the major players.
The Prospect of Mainland China-Taiwan Relations
From late 1995, the PRC conspicuously has taken a series of aggressive
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actions toward Taiwan. These defecting activities, including three rounds of missile
exercises and a large-scale military maneuver were conducted during the aftermath of
President Lee's American Trip and before the Taiwan presidential elections on March
23, 1996. What does mainland China hope to achieve? Why the new defection instead
of cooperation? Will the strategy backfire?
According to Lin Chung-pin, a professor at Geogetown University and a
specialist in mainland China's military strategy, the missile exercise is probably the
latest in a string of psychological warfare tactics aimed at inciting fear and exploiting
difference between rival groups within Taiwan. 153 Under the shadow of the likelihood
of Taiwan independence, the PRC held missile exercises in pursuit of multi-political
goals. In the short run, it is believed that the major propose of these military
maneuvers lay in affecting the result of the presidential election.
Through military threats, mainland China also hoped to depress the advocacy
of Taiwan independence and back up the presidential candidate LinYang-kang who
claims to modify the so-called pragmatic diplomacy to soothe the PRC's hostility.
According to the PRC's evaluation, although Lin may lose in the election, he can
influence the vote for Lee, i.e., it is expected to go below 50% of the total voting. In
the end, it may affect Lee's attitude and position toward the PRC. That is, when the
occasion comes for contact and negotiation between political leaders from both sides,
Lee , with a limited mandate, could not stand firm and may be forced to make some
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concessions on certain issues regarding the status and future of Taiwan.
On the other hand, for the perspective of the PRC ongoing or coming power
struggle in the post-Deng era, the maneuvers may reflect an internal struggle for
prestige between Jiang Zemin and the military of which he is the titular head. If so,
the "Taiwan issue" is merely treated as a means to draw attention.
What is Taiwan's reaction to the PRC's aggressive strategy? Would the
mainland China-Taiwan Chicken game continue into the future? Or, could it be
possible for both sides to reverse the game to Prisoner's Dilemma or Deadlock?
Before answering these questions, we should take a couple of endogenous and
exogenous factors into account.
At the moment of writing this thesis, the presidential elections on Taiwan just
ended, with Lee Teng-hui's overwhelming victory ( Lee attained almost 55 % of the
popular vote). This result may indicate that
mainland China

Lee's attitude and position on

would dominate the development of mainland China-Taiwan

relations in the future. In other words, Lee's request for peaceful coexistence and
Taiwan's international standing will be high on the agenda for adjusting the current
mainland China policy. To appease the tension across Taiwan Straits after the election,
Taiwan authorities intend to resume the channel of mutual communication through
SEF and AFRATS. On the other hand, the government in reportedly inclined to
accept the proposal for direct contacts (trade, mail, and transportation) initiated by the
PRC under one condition--the PRC views Taiwan as an equal political entity.
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If both sides allow direct contacts, Taiwan, a country lacking of natural
resources and cheap labor, would gradually depend on

mainland China more than

ever. By contrast, Taiwan's economic and political systems may gradually affect the
PRC. In general, through direct contacts, through either the model of people to people
or government to government, mutual differences between both sides regarding the
reunification of China or other issues would be reduced. Moreover, the PRC could
force Taiwan's leaders to drop the idea of independence or stifle the movement of
Taiwan independence to a certain extent. Since direct contacts are conducive to
increase mutual benefits, then, the question would be: Could it be possible for the
PRC to recognize Taiwan as a political entity? If so, the policy makers in both sides
have to take into account what extent and in what form they could conduct such a
settlement.

In fact, the chance of such recognition is slim in the short term. Facing

the coming succession crisis in the post-Deng era, the new generation of leaders
would not take a weak position on the Taiwan issue because no one can bear the
likely reproach like the loss of Taiwan.
Could this developing tendency turn into actions? As for the possibility for the
PRC's military attack against Taiwan, based on the internal calculation, the PLA
judges that the conditions are not really ripe for them to take Taiwan by force. The
reasons include: (a) the Taiwan military is quite strong; (b) Taiwan with a strong
financial position, a huge foreign reserve, can procure weapons from the international
market quite easily, if necessary; (c) the U.S. may commit to Taiwan's security
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according to the Taiwan Relations Act; (d) Taiwan has not yet declared independence
and the PRC has not yet been pushed to the comer; (e) they would damage official
relations with the U.S. if the PRC launched military actions toward Taiwan; (f) even
if the PLA successfully conquered Taiwan, the PRC would encounter a major
problem regarding the governing Taiwan, which according .to the more sober
members of the PRC government was beyond their present capacity. 154
Reportedly, in October 1995, Taiwan announced that it would increase by
20% of the defense budget for the year 1996-97, bring it to $11 billion. 155 In
addition, Taiwan in recent years has been dedicated to an upgrade of its military
equipment. They have secured contracts on F-16s from the U.S. and Mirage 2000
jets and six Lafayette-class frigates from France. According to one Japanese source,
given its financial power and the capacity to introduce Western technologies, up till
the end of twentieth century Taiwan's defense capacity will exceed that of the
PRC. 156 If this evaluation is valid, the cost for the PRC to take Taiwan by force will
be higher than evaluated. Besides, the PRC continues to reform its economic system.
As Chen Yun pointed out in the early 1990s, it would be unwise for the PRC to
intensify pressure on Taiwan by military muscle instead to encourage cooperation
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between both sides. In addition, due to the American commitment to Taiwan's
security based on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the PRC's attempt to conduct
military activities against Taiwan will be depressed, directly or indirectly.
According to the preceding inferences, we may predict that both sides would
continue to play a game of Chicken in which Taiwan will gradually become a real
counterpart to mainland China. The enhancement of penalties for mutual defection
which results from Taiwan's military improvement will obviously contribute to the
maintenance of the dynamic balance between both sides. Also, this would discourage
mainland China from adopting more aggressive actions toward Taiwan in future
games. By contrast, the use of direct contacts between both sides will increase mutual
payoffs and inspire the players to cooperate. In addition, signing a peaceful agreement
in which mainland China rules out the likelihood of using force toward Taiwan and
Taiwan promises to cooperate in promoting the reunification of China is also possible
for both sides.
Based on the logic of our model-- Chicken, and since mutual defection
would inevitably lead the players to mortal disaster, we may predict that decision
makers in mainland China and Taiwan as rational actors will try their best to eschew
it and cooperate an effort to explore a bilateral acceptable settlement for the future of
China and Taiwan.
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